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SECONDARY BOYCOTTS: UNDERSTANDING
NLRB INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8(b)(4)(b)
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Richard A. Bockt
Nothing is pointless, and nothing is meaningless if the artist will
face it. And it's his business to face it. He hasn't got the right to
sidestep it like that. Human life itself may be almost pure chaos,
but the work of the artist-the only thing he's good for-is to take
these handfuls of confusion and disparate things, things that
seem to be irreconcilable, and put them toqether in a frame and
give them some kind of shape and meaning.
For more than twenty years, there has been virtually no significant
scholarly work exclusively devoted to explaining the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) interpretation of the secondary boycott
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (Act or NLRA). Yet the
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I. GEORGE PLIMPTON, WRITERS AT WORK: THE PARIS REVIEW INTERVIEWS 150-51 (2d
series 1963) (quoting literary legend Katherine Ann Porter).
2. A number of law review and journal articles addressing the subject were written at
or about the time the Supreme Court issued its second and final decision in Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), in which
the Court held, inter alia, peaceful handbilling free from those proscriptions. See, e.g.,
Steven L. Brown, Nonpicketing Labor Publicity Not Within the Secondary-Boycott
Prohibition of Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act: Edward J. DeBartolo
Corporation v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council, 31 B.C. L.
REV. 139 (1990) (describing the nonpicketing labor publicity exclusion from the definition
of secondary boycotts); Brian K. Beard, Comment, Secondary Boycotts After DeBartolo:
Has the Supreme Court Handed Unions a Powerful New Weapon?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 217
(1989) (debating the impact of the DeBartolo decision); see also infra notes 91-100 and
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law continues to evolve, as manifest in the numerous reported decisions
discussed and explained below, and the importance of such cannot be
overstated.3
Perhaps the dearth of scholarly work in this area is due to frustration
with a law that many find chaotic and confusing.4 Others find section
8(b)(4)(B) Board case law unjust or outdated against the backdrop of an
ever-changing industrial landscape.5 Regardless of the reason, after twenty
accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in the second DeBartolo decision). Still
other articles written after the DeBartolo decision address secondary boycotts only as part of
a larger discussion. See, e.g., Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L.
REV. 807, 839-843 (1993) (including secondary boycotts in a study of boycotts in general);
James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New
Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 934-42 (1991) (addressing
aspects of secondary boycott law in context of a larger discussion and offering a different
philosophical approach to boycott law generally). Yet other pieces focus on components of
secondary boycott law. See, e.g., Jon E. Pettibone, Bannering Neutrals-Coercive
Secondary Boycott or Free Speech?, 18 LAB. LAW. 349 (2003) (describing the debate over
whether bannering is a coercive secondary boycott); Holly R. Winefsky & Julie A. Tenney,
Note, Preserving the Garment Industry Proviso: Protecting Acceptable Working
Conditions Within the Apparel and Accessories Industry, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 587 (2002)
(addressing the NLRA garment industry proviso that allows garment worker unions to
engage in coercive conduct); Rachelle I. Moskowitz, Arbitration as an Unfair Labor
Practice, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 865 (1997) (discussing the D.C. Circuit decision holding
that a union violated the secondary boycott provision of the NLRA when it demanded
arbitration through the use of a secondary boycott); Timothy van der Veen, National Labor
Relations Board May Enjoin Union's Group Shopping Demonstration as Unfair Labor
Practice-Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013 (1st Cir. 1995), 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1005 (1997) (addressing various components of boycott law).
3. Section 8(b)(4)(B) Board decisions often serve as the basis for pursuit of damages
under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2000). See
David A. Anderson, Hot Cargo Enforcement After Kaiser Steel: A New Look at Section
8(e), 1983 UTAH L. REV. 493, 500 n.39 (1983) (discussing the significance of the Board's
General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint).
4. See LEROY S. MERRIFIELD ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
399 (9th ed. 1994) (viewing secondary boycott law as complicated); see also JULIUS
GETMAN & BERTRAND P. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND
PRACTICE 259 (1998) (observing that section 8(b)(4)(B) functions in ways that are
economically deceptive and functionally confusing); CHARLES GREGORY, LABOR AND THE
LAW 420, 426 (2d ed. 1958) (characterizing the Taft Hartley Act's secondary boycott
provisions as a complicated and "dreadful mess").
5. See, e.g., GARY MINDA, BOYCOTr IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY
SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND 111 (1999) (opining that it is difficult to justify the secondary
boycott prohibitions in the NLRA); Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act:
What Went Wrong; Can We Fix it?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125 (2003) (advocating for the repeal
of section 8(b)(4)(B)); see also Katherine V.W. Stone, Employee Representation in the
Boundaryless Workplace, 77 CHI. KENT L. REV. 773, 798-99 (2002) (expressing the view
that the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA are no longer viable or tenable); Daniel
J. Chepaitis, The National Labor Relations Act, Non-Paralleled Competition, and Market
Power, 85 CAL. L. REV. 769, 771 n.8 (1997) (noting that the prohibition on secondary
boycotts is viewed unfavorably by those in favor of unionization) (citing PAUL C. WEILFR,
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years of doctrinal development one cannot dispute the value associated
with the placement of this area of law into a scholarly frame, where it can
be given a measure of shape, meaning, and understanding. Although this
task may prove more a lawyerly art than a science, it is hoped that after the
final stroke is applied to this canvas, the reader will understand this subject
better than before she opened this volume, and that it may serve as a
reference for those confronted with problems or confusion in the area.
Accordingly, this Article will present a comprehensive explanation of
the most common and some not so common problems that arise under
sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e).6 After defining terms and setting forth history
and the applicable NLRA sections, this Article will explore NLRB case
law, breaking down those sections into their various constituent parts and
offering the kind of statutory dissection pivotal to understanding the entire
area.
I. DEFINING THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT
As is often the case, the Act fails to provide a statutory definition for a
term so often in need of interpretation.7 Perhaps the most widely cited
definition was written more than seventy years ago by Felix Frankfurter
and Nathan Greene in The Labor Injunction! The authors described the
secondary boycott as a combination to influence A by exerting economic or
social pressure against persons with whom A deals.9 It has been put more
succinctly as "a combination to harm one person by coercing others to
harm him."1°
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 269-73
(1990)); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for
Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 415 (1984) (opining on the decline of union
representation in the workforce).
6. Although the majority of this Article is devoted to section 8(b)(4)(B), discussion of
secondary boycotts compels analysis of section 8(e) as well. See infra notes 321-369 and
accompanying text (discussing section 8(e)).
7. Comment, The Landrum Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of The Secondary
Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 724 (1960); IBEW, Local 98 (The Tel. Man, Inc.), 327 N.L.R.B.
593, 597 (1999); MINDA, supra note 5, at 101; Theodore J. St. Antoine, Secondary Boycotts
and Hot Cargo: A Study in Balance of Power, 40 U. DET. L.J. 189, 195 (1962). The genesis
of the term "boycott" is itself the subject of an interesting anecdote, having been traced to
the difficulties experienced by one Captain Boycott, an agent of England's Lord Earne, and
who, upon serving certain notices on Eame's tenants, was shunned by all those he
employed, forcing the Captain and his wife to harvest their own fields and produce their
own food. W.A. MARTIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS 101-02 (1910).
8. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930).
9. Id.; see also RALPH M. DERESHINSKY ET AL., THE NLRB AND SECONDARY
BOYCOTTS 1 (1981) (referencing the Frankfurter-Greene definition); St. Antoine, 40 UNIV.
DET L.J 189, supra note 7, at 189 (discussing the definition of secondary boycotts).
10. DUANE MCCRACKEN, STRIKE INJUNCTIONS IN THE NEW SOUTH 13 (1931) (citing
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The typical paradigm in the industrial context" features a labor
organization with a dispute against A, but instead of merely pressuring A
directly with a strike, picket, handbill or other action, the labor organization
pressures A indirectly, by making A's clients, suppliers or other persons
with whom A conducts business the target of such activity. The desired
effect is to pressure A to capitulate to union demands by virtue of the threat
of those other persons terminating their relationships with A in order to be
rid of the unwanted union pressure.'
2
There can be no question that a union's use of the secondary boycott
has potentially devastating effects upon parties neutral to the dispute
between the union and its more direct target.13 At issue for the Board, and
the subject of this Article, are the boundaries between lawful and unlawful
secondary conduct, and the Board's case law setting out those boundaries.
II. SECTIONS 8(b)(4)(b), 8(e), AND How WE GOT THERE
Organized labor's use of the secondary boycott can be traced to
America's earliest years.14  Even before 1900, courts routinely held
secondary boycotts unlawful as criminal conspiracies. 1" Later, they were
enjoined by courts of equity through broad application of antitrust law, part
of a sweeping wave of anti-union sentiment culminating with the
imposition of the Sherman Antitrust Act upon the activities of organized
labor.' 6 Some of the earliest injunctions against union activities involved
secondary components, and these cases played a major role in the doctrinal
development of antitrust applicability to the right to strike, picket, and
boycott.
7
L.D. CLARK, THE LAW OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF LABOR 289-90); see also IBEW, Local 501
v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950) (reasoning that the gravamen of the secondary
boycott is having its sanctions bear not upon the employer who, alone, is a party to the
dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it, in an effort to cause said party
to stop doing business with that employer in the hope this will induce the employer to give
in to certain demands), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
11. This Article does not discuss political boycotts. See Stone, supra note 5 (discussing
and proposing an application of the constitutional political boycott law to industrial
disputes).
12. DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 1.
13. Id.
14. DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO
CORPORATE LIBERALISM 71 (1995).
15. DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 1-2; ERNST, supra note 14, at 72 (citing State v.
Stewart, 9 A. 559 (Vt. 1887) and State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890 (Conn. 1887)); Russell Jones,
Secondary Picketing Under the Railway Labor Act: Burlington Northern Resolves the
Dispute, 19 S.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992).
16. DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 1; Jones, supra note 15, at 3; see Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274 (1908).
17. JOHN P. FREY, THE LABOR INJUNCTION: AN EXPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT BY
SECONDARY BoYcoTTS
The United States Supreme Court decision in Loewe v. Lawlor" is a
proper starting point. In Loewe, the 9000-member strong United Hatters of
America organized a nationwide boycott of one Danbury, Connecticut hat
manufacturer in an effort to organize the manufacturer's employees.' 9 The
boycott included, inter alia, efforts to intimidate wholesale dealers into
foregoing their purchases or deals with the hat manufacturer.2 °  The
manufacturer sued under section 7 of the Sherman Act, with the Court
reversing a lower court's dismissal of the complaint.2' The impact of the
Court's decision at the time cannot be overstated.22 While the secondary
boycott aspect of the fabled Danbury Hatters case is often lost on history,23
Loewe's significance stems from its application of antitrust principles to the
activities of organized labor, viewing unions as unlawful combinations,
capable of engaging in restraint of free trade.
Only six years later, with increasing labor unrest, Congress responded
with passage of the Clayton Act, an apparent effort to reverse the effects of
the Loewe decision. 24 While on its face, labor's Magna Carta 25 served as a
JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE AND ITS MENACE 12-13 (Editor International Moulder's Journal
1923).
18. 208 U.S. 274 (1907).
19. Id. at 304-05.
20. Id. at 307.
21. Id. at 309.
22. See ERNST, supra note 14, at 167-69 (observing Gompers' view that the decision in
Loewe brought the continued viability of unions into doubt). The effect of the Court's
decision was so dramatic that the union was forced to levy assessments upon the earnings of
its members to collect what amounted to more than $400,000 in costs. Id. at 152-55.
Hundreds of union members faced threats of foreclosure on their homes in order to meet the
cost of the damages, with several workers, whose life earnings were attached by the Court,
committing suicide. Louis WALDMAN, LABOR LAWYER 208 (1945).
23. See GREGORY, supra note 4, at 208-10 (discussing that the Court found
jurisdictional components significant rather than the secondary nature of the conduct in
holding that there was a violation of the Sherman Act); see also PHILIP S. FONER, The
Policies and Practices of the American Federation of Labor 1900-1909, in HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Vol. III) 309-13 (1981) (stressing the
significance of the fact that the suit was filed against individual members of the union).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000). Section 6 of the Clayton Act declared the labor of a
human being not to be a commodity or article of commerce, and further set forth that the
antitrust laws would not prohibit the existence of unions or hold them to be unlawful
combinations. Section 20 of the legislation, on its face, limited the jurisdiction of federal
courts to enjoin strikes and other matters arising out of cases between employers and
employees. The Clayton Act was passed against the backdrop of increasing labor unrest,
culminating with the 1,000-employee strike against Colorado Fuel and Iron in 1913.
Strikers departed the company's camps and set up tent colonies nearby, one of which was
attacked by armed guards resulting in the deaths of 21 strikers and their children. PRISCILLA
MUROLO & A.B. CHITTY, FROM THE FOLKS WHO BROUGHT YOU THE WEEKEND: A SHORT
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (2001).
25. The Clayton Act was given this moniker by labor leader, Samuel Gompers, a key
figure in the Danbury Hatters case who, upon its enactment, lauded the legislation as, "the
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Congressional sanction for that which the Court condemned in Loewe,
organized labor's victory was fleeting. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering,26 the Supreme Court held that the Clayton Act did not provide
statutory protection to secondary boycotts, and worse yet, actually gave
employers a private right of action to seek injunctive relief and treble
damages for such activity. Only four years later, in Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers,28 the Court reaffirmed the view that antitrust law
could put a stop, not only to secondary activity, but to primary union
protests as well.
Organized labor lived with the law of Loewe, Duplex and Coronado
throughout the 1920's, the intensity of its lobbying effort to legislate away
those decisions reaching a crescendo after the United States Supreme Court
decision in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters
Association.29 The American Federation of Labor spent the next five years
strongly urging Congressional action to provide more meaningful relief
than the Clayton Act could offer, finally achieving success in 1932.30 That
year saw passage of the Norris LaGuardia Act, 31 which put a statutory end
to the use of injunctive relief to stop a wide array of union activity,
including the secondary boycott.32 However, while Norris LaGuardia
represented a victory for organized labor, its significance must nevertheless
be measured against the troubled economic environment present at the time
of its enactment. As free as unions were to strike, picket, or engage in
secondary boycotts, they were in no position to combat the deteriorating
Magna Carta upon which the working people will rear their structure of industrial freedom."
ERNST, supra note 14, at 165.
26. 254U.S.443(1921).
27. See GREGORY, supra note 4, at 209 (discussing the right of private parties to obtain
injunctions against violations of the Sherman Act).
28. See 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (holding in a primary strike that the union's intent to
interfere with company's ability to move produce in interstate commerce violated the
Sherman Act).
29. 274 U.S. 37 (1927). In Bedford, in an effort to force the company into recognizing
the union, the Journeymen Stone Cutters Association of North America directed its
members who worked for various contractors not to work on stone produced by Bedford.
Id. at 42-43. The Court enjoined the activity. Id. at 54-55.
30. See EMANUEL STEIN ET AL., LABOR AND THE NEW DEAL 78 (1934) (describing union
efforts to obtain passage of a federal anti-injunction law); see also Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 805 (1945) (tracing the history of antitrust
applicability to union activity).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988).
32. DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 2. While section 3 of that Act put an end to so-
called Yellow Dog contracts, pursuant to which employees agreed not to join or to withdraw
their membership from a union, section 4 and its constituent subsections (a) through (i)
precluded courts of equity from enjoining secondary boycotts. Specifically, it divested
courts of jurisdiction from enjoining strikes, picketing and other activities growing out of a
labor dispute, and, as set forth in subsection (i) "advising, urging or otherwise causing or
inducing" those enumerated activities." Id. at § 104(a)-(i).
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economic circumstances in which they found themselves.
33  Those
circumstances led to the New Deal, including the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA),34 which, for the first time, featured labor
provisions offering statutory protection safeguarding the right to organize
and bargain collectively.35
After NIRA failed to sustain constitutional challenge,
36 the NLRA was
passed in 1935, containing essentially the same safeguards as those set
forth in NIRA's section 7(a), and subsequently became the first piece of
New Deal legislation to pass constitutional muster.
37  This expansion of
rights, albeit against the backdrop of deteriorating wages and job loss,
culminated with the Court's decisions in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
38 and
United States v. Hutcheson,39 which conclusively held federal anti-trust
principles inapplicable to the activities of organized labor.
40
Thus, for the next four years, unions enjoyed a relatively unfettered
legal right to engage in secondary activities.
4
1 However, in 1945, the
33. See STEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 10 (describing the effects of the Great
Depression on labor).
34. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
35. Section 7(a) of NIRA, the precursor to section 7 of the NLRA, set forth in pertinent
part:
[e]mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference,
restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of
such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. at 198.
36. See A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding
the NIRA unconstitutional).
37. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The decision in Jones
& Laughlin Steel, issued on April 12, 1937, is still marked and remembered at Board offices
throughout the country as "Constitutionality Day." Ironically, eight years to the day the
NLRA was declared Constitutional, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died peacefully in
Warm Springs, Georgia, on April 12,1945.
38. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). In Apex, the American Federation of Full Fashioned Hosiery
Workers struck numerous Philadelphia area factories in an effort to organize Apex Hosiery
and in furtherance of its demand that the non-union contractor agree to be a closed shop. Id.
at 481. The Court held that the Sherman Act did not cover the kind of activities in which
the union engaged. Id. at 512-13.
39. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). In Hutcheson, a union struck Anheuser-Busch, and induced
other union members to boycott the company's products. Id. at 238-39. The Court found
the Sherman Act inapplicable to such activity by virtue of the safeguards provided by the
Norris LaGuardia and Clayton Acts. Id. at 233-34.
40. Id. at 235-36.
41. See HAROLD W. METZ, LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 40-57 (1945)
(discussing unions' rights to strike, picket, and boycott after passage of the Norris
LaGuardia Act). But see Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritters Cafd, 315 U.S. 722, 727-28
(1942) (holding that picketing at a neutral restaurant could be enjoined by a state antitrust
statute, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Supreme Court issued its decision in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.
3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,42 a secondary boycott
case, in which the Court carved out the genesis of what is popularly known
today as the non-statutory exemption to antitrust law. However, the Court
still found Local 3 liable in antitrust based upon its role in an effort to close
off out-of-state contractors from the New York electrical market.43
Shortly thereafter, in 1947, Congress passed the Taft Hartley
Amendments to the NLRA, 44 which for the first time, included union unfair
labor practices, among them section 8(b)(4)(A),45 the precursor to today's
42. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
43. Id. at 809. In Allen Bradley, inter alia, the union threatened electrical contractors
with work stoppages if they installed items manufactured by companies with which the
union had no collective bargaining relationship. Id. at 799. Finding that the union was
engaged in a program to assist contractors in the monopolization of all business in New
York City, the Court held the union in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 810.
Significantly, however, the Court observed that an agreement between the union and
contractors not to handle goods manufactured by non-union producers, without more, would
not run afoul of the Sherman Act. Id. at 809. It was the magnitude of the effort, including
the threats of work stoppage, that persuaded the Court that the union's conduct reached too
far to avoid antitrust liability. Id. Nevertheless, the concept of a non-statutory exemption to
antitrust law for anticompetitive measures negotiated through the collective bargaining
process was born. A complement to the statutory exemption contained in the Norris
LaGuardia Act, this judicial creation was reaffirmed in at least three subsequent cases:
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Local 189, Amalgated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); and Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters, Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), the latter of which is discussed in greater
length supra at notes 365-368 and accompanying text. Thirteen years after deciding Allen
Bradley, the Court found a work stoppage to enforce a collectively bargained for agreement,
which essentially compelled the employer to do business only with union contractors, to run
afoul of section 158(b)(4)(A), the precursor to today's section 158(b)(4)(B). The Court
ruled that way despite finding the agreement itself lawful. Local 1976, United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 111 (1958).
44. The Taft Hartley Amendments were passed against the backdrop of an increasing
wave of anti-union sentiment in response to a series of strikes to protest post-World War II
layoffs and price increases. See generally MELVYN DUBOFSKY AND FOSTER RHEA DULLES,
LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 326-35 (2004).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1947). Section 158(b)(4)(A) provided as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-to
engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities, or to perform any services . . . where in either case an object
thereof is-forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization ... [or] to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person ....
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section 8(b)(4)(B). The enactment of section 8(b)(4)(A) represented a
congressional effort to return to the common law, which prohibited
secondary boycotts. Included therein was the availability of injunctive
relief through mandatory pursuit thereof by regional offices of the National
Labor Relations Board, upon evidence of reasonable cause of a violation,
and where injunctive relief would be just and proper.
46 However, the
section did not outlaw all secondary boycotts. Rather, it provided for a
bifurcated approach to such activities, proscribing only certain kinds of
labor organization actions and inducements or encouragements that were
undertaken with a "secondary object." The Board routinely rejected early
constitutional challenges to this legislation,47 with the issue being firmly
put to rest by the Supreme Court in the 1950 Samuel Langer case.
48
However, several problems, or loopholes, in section 8(b)(4)(A)
became apparent. First, the proscribed inducements set forth in that section
were limited to those directed against the employees of statutory
employers. 49 The statutory terms "employee" and "employer," defined in
the Act's section 2(3) and 2(2) respectively, maintained definitions
46. Section 10(1) states that
[w]henever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph 4(A), (B) or (C) of section 158(b), or section
158(e) or 158(b)(7) of this title, the preliminary investigation of such charge
shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of
like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after
such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be
referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint
should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district
court within any district where the unfair labor practice in question occurred, is
alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business,
for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with
respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court
shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining
order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law...
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (2000). With regard to the "reasonable cause" prong, it is not the
function of the court to decide the merits of the unfair labor practice. McLeod v. Local 25,
IBEW, 344 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1965); Douds v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union,
Local 584, 248 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1957). In determining whether injunctive relief is just and
proper within the meaning of Section 10(1), federal courts are guided by traditional equitable
principals. See Danielson v. Local 275, Int'l Union, 479 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1973).
47. See, e.g., In re Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, Local 1 (Schenley
Distillers Corp.), 78 N.L.R.B. 504 (1948) (noting that the Board explicitly rejected the
assertion that section 158(b)(4)(A) was unconstitutional), enforced, 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.
1949). Notably, Schenley was the first Board case interpreting section 158(b)(4)(A).
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 88 (1949).
48. See IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (declaring that section 158(b)(4)
carries with it no constitutional abridgement of free speech).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1947).
20051
914 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:4
excluding various groups from the Act's coverage.50 Limit of the law by
virtue of those statutory definitions thereby left the excluded groups
unprotected from the secondary boycott.5'
Second, the inducements proscribed in the Act were limited to those
of concerted refusals, leaving open the possibility of unions either
appealing to single employees or working on a one-by-one basis.52
Third, section 8(b)(4)(A) made no mention of activity undertaken
directly against neutral employers, leaving unions free to engage in
threatening or coercive conduct targeted at those employers, via direct
appeals to management or their supervisory personnel.53
Finally, nothing in section 8(b)(4)(A) made it unlawful for a union and
an ostensibly neutral employer to voluntarily enter into an agreement
obligating the employer not to handle the goods of, or do business with,
other employers who either did not have a contract with the union, or
whom the union deemed unfair.54 Indeed, the Court's earlier decision in
Allen Bradley, in effect, held that such agreements, where limited, would
not violate antitrust laws. Further sanction for such agreements is found in
the Court's 1958 decision in Sand Door Plywood, in which it found that
strikes to enforce such clauses were unlawful under section 8(b)(4)(A) but
did not find the clauses themselves illegal.55
Thus, Congress set out to close these loopholes when it drafted
sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). Section 8(b)(4)(B), while endeavoring to
close some of those loopholes, maintained the analytical bifurcation of
section 8(b)(4)(A), again requiring an action element as well as a secondary
object component.56 Section 8(b)(4)(B) made it an unfair labor practice for
50. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2000). Section 2(3), which defines the
term employee, distinctly excludes supervisors and independent contractors from that
definition, while section 2(2), which defines employer, excludes agricultural employers,
those subject to the Railway Labor Act, and federal and state governments. In addition, at
the time section 8(b)(4)(A) was enacted, the Board did not exercise jurisdiction over
healthcare institutions.
51. DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 4-5; St. Antoine, supra note 7, at 196-97.
52. See NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 673 (1951) (observing the need
for an appeal for concerted action, rather than a simple request to individual employees to
honor a picket line). This case is far more significant for serving as the genesis of the
distinction between primary and secondary appeals, discussed infra notes 189-201 and
accompanying text.
53. See DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 5.
54. See, e.g., In re Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers,
Local 294 (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 976-77 (1949) (implicitly sanctioning
closed shop agreement and strike in furtherance of complying therewith), enforced sub nom.
Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
55. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 111
(1958).
56. See, e.g., Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 87 (Trinity Bldg. Maint. Co.), 312
N.L.R.B. 715, 742-43 (1993) (explaining that, in order to establish a violation of section
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a labor organization or its agents:
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport,
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is -
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, manufacturer, or to cease doing
business with any other person ... Provided, That nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful,
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing.
Two additional provisos followed. The first carved out refusals by
persons to enter the premises of employers whose employees are engaged
in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees
whom such employer is required to recognize under the Act.
57 The second,
and the source of far more litigation, providing that nothing in
subparagraph (4) "be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing,
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and
members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced
by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute
and are distributed by another employer ....,58
Section 8(e) makes it an unfair labor practice for:
[A]ny labor organization and any employer to enter into any
158(b)(4)(B), a union must be found to have engaged in conduct which either induces 
or
encourages individuals to refuse to perform services, or which threatens, coerces 
or
restrains, and must also be found to have an object of forcing one person to cease dealing
with or doing business with another person), enforced, 103 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1996).
57. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1996 (Visiting Nurse Health
Sys., Inc.), 336 N.L.R.B. 421 (2001) (holding that, despite having possessed a secondary
object by directly targeting a neutral entity, the union did not violate section 158(b)(4)(B)
inasmuch as its actions were in protest against an employer's refusal to honor a Certification
of Representative issued by the Board pursuant to section 9 of the NLRA.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (2000).
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contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from
handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any
of the products of any other employer, or cease doing business
with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to
such extent unenforc[ea]ble and void.5 9
Two provisos followed this section as well. The first made the
provision inapplicable to agreements between a labor organization and
employer in the construction industry, relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work at a construction site.60 The second carved out an
exception in the garment industry by providing that the persons referred to
in sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) did "not include those in the relation of a
jobber, manufacturer, contractor or subcontractor working on the goods or
premises of the jobber or manufacturer... ,,61 Additionally, today's
section 8(b)(4)(A), enacted with the 1959 Landrum Griffin Amendments,
makes it an unfair labor practice to engage in section 8(b)(4)(i) or (ii)
conduct referenced above, where an object thereof is "forcing or requiring
any employer or self-employed person.., to enter into any agreement
which is prohibited by subsection 8(e). 62
Substitution of the word "person" for "employer" eliminated the first
loophole identified. Elimination of the word "concerted" alleviated the
problem identified in the second loophole, while the addition of section
8(b)(4)(ii) dealt with the third loophole. Section 8(e) was a response to the
fourth loophole, as manifest in the earlier referenced Sand Door Plywood
decision, with exceptions carved out for the construction industry and
garment industry.
It is against this backdrop that a discussion leading to an
understanding of the entire area can begin.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2000).
60. Specifically, the proviso states, "[t]hat nothing in this subsection shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry
relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the
construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure or other work." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e).
61. The garment industry proviso states, "[t]hat for the purposes of this subsection and
subsection (b)(4)(B) of the section, the terms 'any employer,' 'any person engaged in
commerce or an industry affecting commerce,' and 'any person' when used in relation to the
terms 'any other producer, processor or manufacturer,' 'any other employer,' or 'any other
person' shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or
subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or
performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing
industry." Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (2000).
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE LAW
As set forth above, albeit in language that would make even the most
experienced lawyer cringe, section 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits certain conduct
which enmeshes parties neutral to the dispute between the union and its
more direct target. The legislative purpose is to shield the unoffending
party from pressure imposed due to controversies not its own.
63
Despite the presence of its six verbs, section 8(b)(4)(i) breaks down
into essentially two components: first, engaging in a strike or other form of
work stoppage; and second, inducing or encouraging certain individuals to
do the same thing. Indeed, to refuse to use, manufacture, process,
transport, handle, or work, is effectively to strike.
64 Section 8(b)(4)(ii) is
more succinct, proscribing threats, coercion, and restraint. Significantly,
each type of conduct set forth in subsection (i) and in subsection (ii) by
itself does not constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(B).
The conduct must have a subsection (B), or secondary object, to be
unlawful under the section.65
As with section 8(b)(4)(i), subsection (B)'s inclusion of five gerunds
makes it appear ominous. However, despite the wordiness, it is fair to say
that to force or require a person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or dealing with another is effectively to force that person to
cease doing business with that other. Thus, this Article, as with the large
majority of section 8(b)(4)(B) cases, focuses the secondary discussion to
the so-called "cease doing business" object.
Although compartmentalized thinking generally leads to poor
analysis, written discussion of this entire area compels separate discussions,
the first focusing on the area of union conduct under section 8(b)(4)(i) and
(ii), and the second focusing on secondary object issues attached to that
conduct.
Union conduct takes on various forms, the most common of which are
the strike and picket, which may or may not rise to the level of section
8(b)(4)(i) or (ii), depending on the circumstances of any given case.
63. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951)
(illustrating that a party will be shielded by the NLRB where it was not legally responsible
for the controversy).
64. See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text for a definition of the term "strike."
65. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 87 (Trinity Bldg. Maint. Co.), 312 N.L.R.B.
715, 742-43 (1993) (citing Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673 (1961); Iron Workers Union, Local 378 (McDevittt & Street Co.),
298 N.L.R.B. 955, 958 (1990); San Francisco Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Goold
Elec.), 297 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1055 (1990); Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San
Franscisco Examiner, Div. of Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 304 (1970), enforced, 443
F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972)), enforced, 103 F.3d 139 (9th
Cir. 1996).
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Secondary object issues on the other hand-whether a person or employer
is in fact neutral to the dispute-often pose more confusing problems.66
The large majority of these fall into six, general areas as follows: the locus
of the conduct; whether that locus is shared by more than one entity, or so-
called common situs cases; ambulatory or mobile sites; activity targeting
products; issues involving struck work, single employers, related corporate
entities; and those involving contractual relationships, which may forfeit
neutral status. Additionally, "cease doing business" agreements, which
compel a party not to do business with certain others, occupy their own
sphere of secondary object law, explored infra notes 118-32 and
accompanying text.
A. Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii) Conduct
Certainly, by virtue of the clear wording of the statute, strikes
automatically fall into the section 8(b)(4)(i) category. Additionally, they
typically have been held to constitute (b)(4)(ii) conduct as well.67 Picketing
raises more complicated issues. Before assessing whether any particular
strike or picket constitutes either section 8(b)(4)(i) or (ii) conduct,
definition of those terms through explanation of evolving caselaw will
enable a better understanding of the area.
1. Strikes, Partial Strikes and Refusals to Volunteer
Although section 1368 of the Act safeguards the right to strike, the
term itself is not defined in section 2.69 Section 501 of the Labor
Management Relations Act defines strike as "any strike or other concerted
66. See Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 366 U.S. at 674(characterizing the task of distinguishing between primary and secondary activity as
"drawing lines more nice than obvious").
67. See notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
68. "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided herein, shall beconstrued so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,
or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2000).
69. Section 2, the NLRA's definitional section, defines the following terms: person;
employer; employee; representatives; labor organization; commerce; affecting commerce;
unfair labor practice; labor dispute; National Labor Relations Board; supervisor;
professional employee; and healthcare institution. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(l)-(14) (2000).
Although section 2(13) makes reference to the term agent, it does not set forth a definition.
Instead, it merely guides the reader in dictating that the lack of authorization or ratification
by the liable party not be controlling. 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (2000). A number of Board
decisions address that topic and reiterate the concept. See, e.g., Met. Dist. Council of Phila.
& Vicinity, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners (E. Allan Reeves, Inc.), 281 N.L.R.B. 493,497 (1986); In re Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 6 (Sunset Line &
Twine Co.) 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1509 (1948) (applying traditional principles of agency law to
the conduct of union stewards or delegates).
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stoppage of work by employees (including stoppage by reason of the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement) and any concerted slow-
down or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.7° Black's
Law Dictionary defines a strike as "It]he act of quitting work by a body of
workers for the purpose of coercing their employer to accede to some
demand they have made upon him, and which he has refused."71 However,
use of the term "work" in that definition may pose confusion.
Initially, any strike may be characterized in terms of its purpose-for
instance, an economic strike to protest working conditions, as opposed to
an unfair labor practice strike undertaken in response to the commission of
such unlawful practices.7 The conduct itself, however, is either total or
partial-in other words, a full walkout, or a refusal to perform only certain
functions. As a general proposition, partial strikes are not protected by the
Act.73 The Board has held that protecting such conduct would essentially
serve as a sanction for the strikers' unilateral determination as to what work
to perform or not to perform.74 Of course, it is well settled that unilateral
action is ordinarily prohibited by the Act, and, at the very least, should
always be viewed with a suspicious eye.75
However, not all "work" is mandatory. In certain situations, the
Board has held that refusals to perform voluntary assignment are not really
strikes at all, and thus, not within the partial strike concept and therefore
protected.76 However, it is not so much the voluntary nature of the
assignment as it is the union's purpose underlying the action that dictates
70. 29 U.S.C. § 142 (2000).
71. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (6th ed. 1990). The definition proceeds to identify
and define various forms of strike, including recognitional, jurisdictional, secondary and
others.
72. This distinction becomes significant in a variety of contexts, the most common
being the applicability of a no strike clause to the stoppage in question. See Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (holding that there were no contractual or statutory
provisions preventing the employees' strike against unfair labor practices, so striking
employees did not lose their status as employees and were entitled to both reinstatement and
back pay, despite the presence of no strike clause in the contract covering the strikers).
73. Local 13-B, Graphic Arts Int'l Union (W. Publishing Co.), 252 N.L.R.B. 936
(1980), enforced, 682 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1982).
74. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 278 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1986); Dow Chem. Co., 152 N.L.R.B.
1150 (1965).
75. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). Unilateral action is permitted in only certain
limited situations, i.e., where parties engaged in negotiations have reached a good faith
impasse, or where economic exigencies may justify the kind of inherently essential
maneuvers not subject to a bargaining obligation. Id. at 741-42.
76. See Local 742, Int'l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers (Randall Bearings,
Inc.), 213 N.L.R.B. 824 (1974) (emphasizing the significance, in this 158(d) case, the
union's admission that its purpose in refusing to perform voluntary overtime was to pressure
the employer to accede to its demands at the bargaining table), enforced, 519 F.2d 815 (6th
Cir. 1975).
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whether it is a strike.77 For instance, in Local P-575 Meat Cutters (Iowa
Beef Packers, Inc.),7 8 the parties' contract set forth that overtime be
voluntary, yet when employees refused to perform the extra hours, the
Board held the action no less a strike than if overtime were mandatory.79
The Board looked past the contract, instead focusing on the fact that the
action itself was designed to cause the employer to capitulate to union
demands, or at least produce a response in view of the fact that the parties'
practice found the unit volunteering on a regular basis for long periods of
time.8°
2. Picketing and Handbilling
In the context of secondary boycott cases, the terms picket and
handbill are often the source of litigation and argument. While charged
unions characterize their conduct as handbilling, affected employers argue
that the conduct constitutes picketing. The distinction is significant as
explained further below in this section.
Once again, the term "picketing" is not defined in the Act, despite
specific references to it in sections 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7). 8' Although the
77. See Local P-575, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 188 N.L.R.B.
5,6(1971).
78. Id. Iowa Beef is cited with approval by the Board in New York State Nurses Ass'n
(Mt. Sinai Hosp.), 334 N.L.R.B. 798 (2001) (holding that the union violated section 158(g)
by failing to give the statutory ten days notice to the employer and Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service before refusing to perform voluntary overtime).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. As noted supra note 45, section 158(b)(4) contains several provisos, the second of
which sets forth that:
[for the purposes of this paragraph 4 only, nothing contained in such paragraph
shall be construed to prohibit publicity other than picketing, for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by
another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing
any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the
course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods,
or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in
such distribution.
29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B) (2000). Section 158(b)(7) specifically makes it an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization to picket, threaten to picket, or cause to be picketed, any
employer where an object thereof is to force or require the employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization in three contexts set forth in subsections (A), (B) and (C) of that
section. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A)(B)(C) (2000).
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traditional definition anticipates signs and an elliptical march, 2 the Board
has long held that neither the presence of picket signs nor the element of a
patrol is necessary to establish a finding that picketing has occurred.83
Rather, the Board's traditional test merely requires the posting of
individuals, by a labor organization, at the approach to a place of business
to accomplish a purpose which advances the cause of the union, 4 and the
concomitant presence of a confrontational element.85 The Board has also
82. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (6th ed. 1990) (noting that picketing is usually
accompanied by patrolling with signs).
83. Dist. Council 9, Int'l Bhd. Painters of Painters & Allied Trades (We're Assocs.,
Inc.), 329 N.L.R.B. 140, 142 (1999); Serv. Int'l Employees Union, Local 87 (Trinity Bldg.
Maint. Co.), 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 743 (1993) (citing Laborers Int'l Union, Local 389 (Calcon
Constr. Co.), 287 N.L.R.B. 570, 573 (1987), enforced, 103 F.3d 139, 139 (9th Cir. 1996);
Int'l Union, United Mine Workers (New Beckley Mining Co.), 304 N.L.R.B. 71, 72 (1991),
enforced, 977 F.2d 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers (Gen. Contractor's Ass'n), 262 N.L.R.B. 528, 529 (1982);
Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local 2797 (Stoltze Land & Lumber Co.), 156 N.L.R.B. 388
(1965); United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 (Truax-Traer Coal Co.), 177 N.L.R.B. 213, 218
(1969) (approving the definition enunciated in Stoltze Land & Lumber), enforced, 76
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2828 (7th Cir. 1971).
84. See Am. Fed'n. of Nurses, Local 535 (Kaiser Found. Hosps.), 313 N.L.R.B. 1201,
1202 (1994) (citing Stoltze Land & Lumber, supra note 83).
85. Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 (Alden Press, Inc.), 151 N.L.R.B. 1666, 1669
(1965). There is a significant history which led to the Board's requirement of the element of
confrontation as a predicate for finding picketing. In February 1962, the Board held that the
act of placing signs in snow banks constituted picketing. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers (Woodward Motors, Inc.), 135 N.L.R.B.
851 (1962). In January 1963, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the Board's Order in Woodward, commenting that at the very least, the Board had
not acted unreasonably in determining such activity to constitute picketing. NLRB v. Local
182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, 314 F.2d 53, 57-58
(2d Cir. 1963). In September 1963, the Board held that general parading through a shopping
district with signs constituted picketing, albeit without a recognitional object. Alton Wood
River & Constr. Trades Council (Jerseyville Retail Merchs. Ass'n), 144 N.L.R.B. 526, 528
(1963). In March 1964, the Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's decision citing
the Second Circuit's decision in Woodward that, where union agents placed signs on trees
and poles in front of an employer's facility, the conduct constituted picketing. United
Furniture Workers (Jamestown Sterling Corp.), 146 N.L.R.B. 474, 478 (1964). However,
when the case got to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in October
1964, Judge Kaufman remanded the matter back to the Board, finding an insufficient basis
upon which to conclude that the conduct in question was picketing. NLRB v. United
Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964). The court found that a necessary condition
of picketing is the presence of a confrontation of some form between union members and
those seeking to enter the premises at issue and was unsure of the extent to which the Board
considered the level of confrontation necessary to constitute picketing. Id. at 939. When
the Board decided Alden Press in 1965, and found, contrary to the decision in Jerseyville
Retail Merchs. Ass'n, that general parading through a mall did not constitute picketing, it
specifically referenced the Second Circuit's Jamestown Sterling decision in observing that
the confrontational element is necessary to show the presence of picketing. Chi.
Typographical Union No. 16 (Alden Press, Inc.), 151 N.L.R.B. at 1669. Nevertheless, the
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included in the definition of picketing a concept known as signal picketing,
most commonly found where the stationing of union agents, signs, or both
at the entrance to a business acts as a signal to others to induce action by
them.86 The number of individuals engaged in the conduct is not the
controlling factor.87 Thus, where employees, regardless of number, gather
around a sign or are milling around, such has been found to constitute
picketing.88 The Board has found the confrontational element where signs
are placed on safety cones, barricades, fenceposts and pickup trucks. 89 The
dispositive component is whether the evidence shows that the union's
appeal is aimed at inducing a response, as distinguished from merely
communicating an idea. The latter concept is most commonly seen in the
form of union handbilling.
Section 8(b)(4)(B)'s second proviso creates an apparent carve-out for
certain conduct deemed "publicity other than picketing" for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public, that a product or products are produced by an
employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
distributed by another employer. Until 1988, the Board viewed the second
proviso as excepting from proscription of the statute otherwise coercive
conduct, which did not rise to the level of a picket.90 The Supreme Court's
kind of "confrontation" anticipated need not involve aggressive or assertive behavior. See,
e.g., Local 1827, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, No. 29-CC-933, 2003 WL
21206515, at 47 (May 9, 2003) (involving use of banners); see also 40-41 Realty Assocs.,
Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 200, 204 n.17 (1988) (declaring that picketing, which took place away
from the main entrance of a facility, was not deprived of its confrontational element).
86. Trinity Bldg. Maint. Co., 312 N.L.R.B. at 743. See Int'l Union Operating Eng'rs,
Local 12 (Hensel Phelps Constr. Co.), 284 N.L.R.B. 246, 248 n.3 (1987) (finding signal
picketing based on the facts of the case); Teamsters Local Union 688 (Levitz Furniture Co.),
205 N.L.R.B. 1131, 1133 (1973) (finding signal picketing on the basis of union agents'
regular presence at the entrance of an employer's parking lot).
87. See, e.g., Lawrence Typographical Union No. 570 (Kan. Color Press, Inc.), 169
N.L.R.B. 279, 283 (1968) (describing an activity involving four individuals), enforced, 402
F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1968); Teamsters Local 688 (Levitz Furniture), 205 N.L.R.B. at 1132
(discussing an activity involving two persons).
88. See Dist. Council 9, Int'l Bhd. Painters of Painters & Allied Trades (We're
Assocs., Inc.), 329 N.L.R.B. 140, 142 (1999) (holding that patrolling is not required for a
finding of picketing) (citing Ironworkers Dist. Council (Hoffman Constr. Co.), 292
N.L.R.B. 562, 583 (1989), enforced, 913 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1990)); Am. Fed'n of Nurses
(Kaiser Found. Hosp.), 313 N.L.R.B. at 1201 n.1 (finding that the presence of union
members holding signs at the hospital entrance constitutes picketing).
89. Local 1329, United Mine Workers (Alpine Constr. Corp.), 276 N.L.R.B. 415, 431
(1985), vacated on other grounds, 812 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Constr. & Gen.
Laborers Union, Local 304 (Athejen Corp.), 260 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1319 (1982).
90. See, e.g., Hosp. & Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 399 (Delta Air Lines, Inc.),
263 N.L.R.B. 996, 996 (1982) (finding certain handbilling constituted (ii) conduct but did
not fall within the protection of the proviso because it was not for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public), vacated, 743 F.2d 1417, 1417 (9th Cir. 1984), and remanded, 293
N.L.R.B. 602 (1989).
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landmark decision in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building & Construction Trades Counci9 1 changed that approach. In
DeBartolo, a union distributed handbills at a shopping mall to protest the
fact that one of the mall's tenants, Wilson, had retained a non-union
contractor, High, to perform certain work.92 The Board at first held that the
handbilling was protected by the publicity proviso, not persuaded by the
lack of a producer-distributor relationship between the parties.93 When the
issue reached the Supreme Court in the first DeBartolo case,94 the Court
was not persuaded by the Board's distinction. Instead, the Court was more
concerned with whether the conduct at issue rose to the level of that
proscribed in section 8(b)(4)(ii) in the first place.95 Thus, the case was
remanded to the Board to rule on that issue, where the Board reached the
conclusion that handbilling, in fact, met the section 8(b)(4)(ii) definition.96
It is that conclusion with which the Court disagreed on appeal, when it
pronounced that the second proviso did not serve to except coercive
conduct from proscription of section 8(b)(4)(ii). 97 Instead, the Court held
that the second proviso was merely a clarifying section, and that peaceful
handbilling does not rise to the level of section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct.98
It is against the backdrop of this area of law that parties often clash as
to whether activity is more akin to handbilling, warranting First
Amendment protection, or rises to the level of a picket, which ordinarily is
deemed restraining or coercive. One concept which DeBartolo does not
change, however, is that handbilling continues to constitute either (i) or (ii)
conduct or both where it is linked to picketing, which runs afoul of either
subsection.99 In Goold Electric, for instance, the Board found that where
secondary picketing and handbilling took place concurrently, both were
91. 485 U.S. 568, 568 (1988).
92. Id. at 570.
93. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council (Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.), 252 N.L.R.B.
702 (1980), petition denied, 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 463 U.S.
147, 148 (1983), on remand, 273 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1985), enforcement denied, 796 F.2d 1328
(11 th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
94. 463 U.S. at 147.
95. See Id. at 157-58 (noting that the Board had not reached the constitutional issue
implicated by a prohibited peaceful handbilling).
96. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council (Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.), 273 N.L.R.B.
at 1431.
97. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 582.
98. Id.
99. Gen. Truck Drivers, Warehousemen, Helpers & Auto. Employees, Local 315
(Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.), 306 N.L.R.B. 616, 631 (1992), enforced, 20 F.3d
1017 (9th Cir. 1994); San Francisco Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Goold Elec.), 297
N.L.R.B. 1050, 1056-57 (1990); National Ass'n of Broad. Employees & Technicians, Local
31 (CBS, Inc.), 237 N.L.R.B. 1370, 1376 (1978), enforced, 631 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Cement Masons Union Local 337 (Cal. Ass'n of Employers), 190 N.L.R.B. 261, 261 n.]
(1971).
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unlawful, notwithstanding the union's protestations that it ceased its
picketing at one point, thereafter only engaging in handbilling"' The
Board adopted the judge's decision in finding the subsequent handbilling
unprotected, concluding that the union could not divorce itself from the
totality of its conduct. °1 In Santa Fe Railway, the Board adopted the
Judge's finding of a violation, and his conclusion that the union's
handbilling was merely part of an illegal picket, in which picketers
distributed handbills.102
Recently, the Board's General Counsel has taken the position that a
union's use of an inflatable rat is in effect no different from a picket and
therefore constitutes section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii) conduct.0 3  As of this
writing, the Board has yet to rule on the issue.
3. Meeting the Definition of Section 8(b)(4)(i)- Inducement and
Encouragement
Section 8(b)(4)(i) and its precursor, section 8(b)(4)(A) prohibit labor
organizations from "engaging in," as well as "inducing or encouraging,"
100. GooldElec., 297 N.L.R.B. at 1056.
101. Id.
102. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 306 N.L.R.B. at 631.
103. See, e.g., Laborers' Eastern Reg'] Organizing Fund (Concrete Structures, Inc.),
JD(NY)-22-05 (June 14, 2005) (holding, inter alia, that a union's use of inflatable rats
accompanied by individuals distributing leaflets at several construction sites constituted
picketing); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 (Brandon Reg'l Med. Ctr.), 2004 WL
2843187 (Dec. 7, 2004) (referencing an administrative law judge's agreement, inter alia,
that use of an inflatable rat at a hospital, in tandem with the misleading nature of handbills
distributed at that site, constituted picketing). At present, the Board has yet to rule on either
of these decisions. See also UNITE (Sterling Laundry, Inc.), No. 5-CC-1278, 2004 WL
1418146, at 5 (N.L.R.B.G.C. Apr. 1, 2004) (alluding to an advice memorandum advocating
the General Counsel's position that the inflatable rat constitutes a picket); Timothy F. Ryan
and Kathryn M. Davis, Banners, Rats, and Other Inflatable Toys: Do They Constitute
Picket Activity? Do They Violate Section 8(b)(4)?, 20 LAB. LAW. 137 (2004). Although it
has not squarely faced the issue, the Board has alluded to the fact that such action violates
158(b)(4)(i) and (ii). See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 19 (Delcard Assocs. Inc.),
316 N.L.R.B. 426, 437-38 (individual in rat costume), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 154 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 1998). Additionally, a number of cases regarding whether
the use of large banners constitutes picketing have led to mixed results from NLRB
administrative law judges, and the Board has not yet ruled on the issue. See Local 1827,
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, No. 28-CC-933, 2003 WL 21206515 (May 9, 2003)
(holding that banner constituted picketing); Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, No.
31-CC-2115, 2004 WL 762435 (Apr. 2, 2004) (holding that banner constituted picketing).
But see Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, No. 31-CC-2113, 2004 WL 350975
(Feb. 18, 2004) (holding that no picketing occurred); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners,
Local 184 & 1498, No. 28-CC-973, 2005 WL 195115 (Jan. 13, 2005) (holding no picketing
occurred); Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, No. 27-CC-877, 2004 WL 2671638
(Nov. 12, 2004) (holding no picketing occurred); Carpenters Local Union No. 1506, No. 31-
CC-2121, 2005 WL 77044 (Jan. 6, 2005) (holding no picketing occurred).
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certain work stoppages. Whether a union engages in a work stoppage is
discussed supra Part II. °4  With regard to inducements and
encouragements, union conduct takes various forms, most often either
picketing or a host of verbal and other appeals.
Analysis of the inducement/encouragement area may be broken down
into essentially two categories. The first involves what kind of statements
or actions constitute inducements or encouragement, while the second
addresses who is being induced to engage in the conduct at issue.
a. What Constitutes Inducement and Encouragement
The United States Supreme Court has held the words "induce or
encourage" broad enough to include all forms of influence or persuasion."
The Board has refined that definition, repeatedly holding that, even
assuming it is directed at neutral employees, whether a union's conduct
constitutes inducement or encouragement depends upon whether that
conduct would reasonably be understood by targeted employees as a signal
or request that they engage in a work stoppage against their own
employer.10 6  The concept is essentially in harmony with Board law
104. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
105. See IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 701-02 (1951) (holding that peaceful picketing
that induces a secondary boycott is nonetheless unlawful); Robert F. Koretz, Federal
Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-Another Chapter, 1959 COLUM. L. REV.
125, 146 (1959) (discussing Samuel Langer).
106. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 122 (August A. Busch & Co.), 334 N.L.R.B. 1190, 1192
(2001) (holding that picketers shouting "boycott Busch" to employees of a radio station
entering a local pub for a promotion did not constitute (i) conduct), enforced, Teamsters
Local 122 v. NLRB, No. 01-1513, 2003 WL 880990, at 1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2003); IBEW,
Local 98 (The Tel. Man, Inc.), 327 N.L.R.B. 593, 595-97 (1999) (holding that a union
agent's statement to neutral employees, "[G]et the fuck out of my building. This is my
building. Everybody get the fuck out of here," constituted (i) conduct); Iron Workers Union
Local 378 (N.E. Carlson Constr., Inc.), 302 N.L.R.B. 200, 210 (1991) (holding that asking
neutral employees why they were crossing the picket lines constituted (i) conduct),
enforced, 996 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1993); Ironworkers Dist. Council (Hoffman Constr. Co.),
292 N.L.R.B. 562, 584-85 (1989) (finding (i) conduct when the union told neutral
employees that their union supported the striking union and asked them why they were
working while a strike was in progress), enforced, 913 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1990); Int'l
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union Local 19 (W. Coast Container Serv., Inc.), 266
N.L.R.B. 193, 195 (1983) (finding (i) conduct where union agent asked neutral employee if
he knew he was scabbing off the longshoremen and could get in some trouble); Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 398 (Robbins Plumbing & Heating Contractors, Inc.), 261 N.L.R.B. 482,
484 (1982) (holding that an employee's statement, on an unlawful picket line, in union
agent's presence, "You're not going to cross this gate, are you," constituted (i) conduct);
Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Independent Const. Contractors), 215
N.L.R.B. 288, 290 (1974) (finding (i) conduct where union agent told neutral employees
that picket line was authorized and sanctioned by their union); Local 3, IBEW (N.Y. Tele.
Co.), 197 N.L.R.B. 328, 331-32 (1972) (holding (i) conduct found where union's general
manager told a membership meeting that employees act as strikebreakers, contrary to trade
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concerning threatening or coercive statements attributed to union agents,
and which requires consideration of whether the comments could
reasonably be construed as coercive or restraintful. 0 7  An express
inducement to strike is not a predicate to finding the presence of section
8(b)(4)(i) conduct. 0 8 Rather, where a work stoppage or refusal to handle
goods is the foreseeable consequence of the conduct in question, the
section 8(b)(4)(i) element will be met.10 9 The success or failure of an
inducement to achieve its desired end is irrelevant to a determination of
whether the conduct at issue rises to the level of section 8(b)(4)(i)."
Instead, the Board takes a case-by-case approach, assessing conduct on the
merits and in the context of each particular case. Thus, where a union
agent merely informs neutral employees that they have a right to choose
not to handle goods produced by an employer with which the union has a
primary dispute, the Board will not find such a statement, alone, to
union principles, by handling materials delivered by a struck employer whose contract was
with a different union), enforced, 477 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1973).
107. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 710 (Stone Container Corp.), 308
N.L.R.B. 95 (1992) (emphasizing that the test for threatening and coercive statements is
whether the union's statements reasonably tend to have a coercive effect and does not
depend on its actual effect on listeners); Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 (Save-On-Drugs,
Inc.), 227 N.L.R.B. 1638 (1977) (finding that statements made by the union were unlawful
because they reasonably tended to restrain or coerce employees from exercising their
statutory right to refrain from joining or supporting the union); Janler Plastic Mold Corp.,
186 N.L.R.B. 540 (1970) (using the reasonableness test to find union statements lawful);
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Local 990 (Troy Textiles, Inc.), 174 N.L.R.B. 1148, 1148
n.1 (1969) (restating that the test for coerciveness is not the actual effect but the reasonably
intended effect).
108. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 525 (Gen. Maint. Serv. Co.), 329 N.L.R.B. 638,
639 n.10 (1999), enforced, 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
109. Id; Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 104 (Losli Int'l Inc.), 297 N.L.R.B.
1078, 1085 (1990) (citing Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union Local 119 (W.
Coast Container Serv. Inc.), 266 N.L.R.B. 193, 196 (1983)).
110. See Millmen & Cabinet Makers Union, Local 550 (Steiner Lumber Co.), 153
N.L.R.B. 1285, 1289 (1965) (holding that "induce and encourage" includes attempts which
do not necessarily have to succeed) (citing NLRB v. Dallas Gen. Drivers, 264 F.2d 642 (5th
Cir. 1959)); NLRB v. Laundry Linen Supply & Dry Cleaning Drivers Local 298 (S. Serv.),
262 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Barry Controls, Inc.), 250
F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1957). Significantly, however, where a union successfully induces
or encourages employees to cease working for their employer, the Board has repeatedly held
that the union also violates section 158(b)(4)(ii) inasmuch as it necessarily acts to restrain or
coerce the employer. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1776, 334
N.L.R.B. 507, 509 n.8 (2001) (finding evidence of unlawful coercion when union
successfully induced or encouraged employees to withhold services); Gen. Teamster,
Warehouse & Dairy Employees Union Local 126 (Ready Mixed Concrete), 200 N.L.R.B.
253, 254 n.6 (1972) (noting that successful inducement or encouragement of workmen to
cease performing services necessarily restrains or coerces their employer). Similarly, where
a union induces primary employees to cease work, but in the presence of a secondary,
neutral party, it also violates section 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
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constitute an unlawful inducement."' Consideration will also be given to
evidence of a union agent's efforts to avoid running afoul of the law.'
12 On
the other hand, the absence of direct evidence of an inducement is not
necessarily dispositive of the case. Reliance on mere circumstantial
evidence to establish a union's responsibility for section 8(b)(4)(i)
inducements is entirely permissible under Board law."
3
The analytical, case-by-case approach to the issue is very much the
same, even where a union goes beyond the traditional oral appeal. For
example, the Board has found a union agent's beckoning motion to neutral
employees, who heeded the call and stopped working, to constitute section
8(b)(4)(i) conduct."14 Written manifestations, such as provisions of union
bylaws, have also been found to meet the test.]
15 Internal union discipline,
111. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Tampa Sand & Material Co.), 132 N.L.R.B.
1564, 1565-66 (1961) (holding that union is not required to refrain from making the law
known to its members); see also Gould Inc., Switchgear Div., 238 N.L.R.B. 618, 622 (1978)
(extending protection to spontaneous walkout where union only told workers that whatever
action they took would be their own choice), enforced, 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980).
112. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 316 (E&E Development Co.), 247 N.L.R.B. 1247,
1248-49 (1980) (finding that non-responsive and equivocal comments manifested an effort
not to engage in conversation about whether an employee should cross a picket line or not).
As consistently circumspect as the Board has been, assessment of a union's conduct can
pose difficulties. Often the Board is placed in the position of having to determine whether a
union is giving the proverbial "nod, wink and a smile" to neutral employees, thereby
engaging in section 8(b)(4)(i) conduct, or whether it is merely communicating in a lawful
way. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local 386 (Warshawsky & Co.), 325 N.L.R.B. 748 (1998)
(Gould, C., concurring) (refusing to find handbilling unlawful, based significantly on a lack
of evidence that union agents made comments to neutral employees), enforcement denied,
182 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999); cf Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 299 (S.M. Kisner
& Sons), 134 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1961) (finding unlawful a union steward's statement to
neutrals that he was "leaving it up to them" as to whether to honor a work stoppage).
113. See Local 456, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Peckham Materials Corp.), 307 N.L.R.B.
612, 617 (1992) (finding no direct evidence that union ordered employees not to load trucks,
but holding nonetheless that circumstantial evidence may establish that union was
responsible for the work stoppage).
114. See, e.g., Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (Associated Eng'rs), 270 N.L.R.B. 1172,
1175 (1984) (explaining a situation in which a union agent motioned with his arms to
neutral employees after which they stopped working).
115. See, e.g., Local 3, IBEW (N. Telcom, Inc.), 265 N.L.R.B. 213, 213 n.2 (1982)
(holding union's bylaws, which required members to prevent their respective employers
from assigning work within the union's jurisdiction to other tradesmen, constituted section
8(b)(4)(i) conduct), enforced, 730 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1984); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 150, 313 N.L.R.B. 659, 670-71 (1994) (finding bylaws unlawful because they
prohibited work on a job where a strike was called and required members to leave when
notified by the union), enforced, 47 F.3d 218 (7th Cir. 1995); Great Falls Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (Purvis-Fedco, Inc.), 154 N.L.R.B. 1637, 1644 (1965) (finding that the
written communication, which advised neutral employees of picketing and urged their
neutral shop steward to advise members that they were working on an unfair job, in tandem
with informing neutral employees that the picket was sanctioned by their local, was
unlawful).
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ordinarily protected by the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A)," 6 if imposed with
a secondary object, has been construed as inducing or encouraging
employees not to work. 1 7 The theory here is that the discipline induces
employees not to work, and that the natural result thereof would be to force
a neutral employer to cease doing business with the primary.' In fact,
even the mere threat of internal union sanctions against members rises to
the level of section 8(b)(4)(i). l l 9
While section 8(b)(4)(i) includes strikes, it does not specifically
mention picketing. The Board has generally regarded picketing as a signal
to neutral workers to cease performing services. 2 ° However, the facts may
dictate that the mere presence of a picket is insufficient to prove unlawful
inducement. Thus, picketing is not per se section 8(b)(4)(i) conduct 2 1
because it is not necessarily always understood by neutral employees as a
signal that they should cease work, nor is such always foreseeable. 22 In
116. 29 U.S.C § 158(b)(1)(A) (2000) (stating that, "[t]his paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein."); see also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969)
(regarding lawful imposition of internal union discipline).
117. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 313 N.L.R.B. at 669-70 (finding unlawful
internal union charges against union employees who crossed picket line during strike)
(citing Local 153, IBEW (Belleville Elec. & Heating Inc.), 221 N.L.R.B. 345 (1975); Local
252, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 166 N.L.R.B. 262 (1967); United Ass'n of
Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. (T.S. Hanson Plumbing),
277 N.L.R.B. 1231 (1985), enforced, 827 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1987); Local 388, United Ass'n
of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. (Daily Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc.), 280 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1986)).
118. See Orange County Dist. Council of Carpenters (J.A. Stewart Constr. Co.), 242
N.L.R.B. 585, 587 (1979) (explaining the holding of Belleville Elect.), enforced, 639 F.2d
789 (9th Cir. 1980).
119. See Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n (Limbach Co.), 305 N.L.R.B. 312,
316-17 (1991) (finding that a refusal to renew collective bargaining agreement also
constituted section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct), enforcement denied on other grounds, 989 F.2d 515
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
120. See United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting
Indus., Local 290 (Hoffman Constr. Co.), 323 N.L.R.B. 1101, 1110 n.47 (1997) (holding
that picketing is presumed to be "inducement" to strike and unlawful "threat" that strike will
occur); Gen. Teamster, Warehouse & Dairy Employees Union, Local 126 (Ready Mixed
Concrete, Inc.), 200 N.L.R.B. 253, 254 n.6 (1972) (noting that picketing that appeals to
employees of secondary employers violates section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the NLRA).
121. See Local 3, IBEW (Atlas Reid, Inc.), 170 N.L.R.B. 584, 588 (1968) (finding that
picketing which coerces and restrains does not necessarily induce or encourage employees
within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(i)); Journeymen Plasterer's Protective & Benevolent
Soc'y, 158 N.L.R.B 1608, 1615-16 (1966) (requiring a determination of whether there was
actual inducement or encouragement of any person that exceeded permissible bounds)
(citing Upholsterer's Frame & Bedding Workers (Minn. House Furnishing Co.), 132
N.L.R.B. 40 (1961)).
122. In each of the following cases, the Board found that picketing need not always rise
to the level of section 8(b)(4)(i) conduct: Teamsters Local 122 (August A. Busch & Co.),
334 N.L.R.B. 1190 (2001), enforced, 2003 WL 880990 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United Food &
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August A. Busch, for instance, picketers confronted radio station employees
entering a local pub at which Busch's Budweiser brand was conducting a
promotion. 23 The picketers, inter alia, urged those employees not to enter
the tavern, asked them why they wanted to go in, and told them to "boycott
Bud."' 124 The Board concluded that while such conduct met the definition
of section (ii) conduct, it did not constitute section (i) action, inasmuch as
the picketers' statements could not be reasonably understood by the
employees to whom they were directed as requests that they engage in a
work stoppage against the radio station.
2 5 Similarly, picketing and hand-
billing at a college and hospital, without evidence of an intention to induce
or encourage neutral employees to cease working for their own employer,
was held not to meet the definition of section (i) conduct.
26  The
evidentiary burden is no different for handbilling, where, regardless of
whether the conduct rises to the level of section (ii) behavior, assessment of
the section (i) issue will depend on the presence of evidence that the
union's conduct could reasonably be interpreted as a signal to employees to
stop working.
27
b. Who is Being Induced-The Servette Doctrine
Section 8(b)(4)(i) prohibits the inducement or encouragement of
individuals, rather than merely employees. In view of the broader
coverage, it is often necessary to assess whether 
a statutory supervisor
128
may be unlawfully induced or encouraged. The Supreme Court confronted
Commercial Workers Union Local 1776, 334 N.L.R.B. 507, 508 (2001); Local 254, Serv.
Employees Int'l Union (Women & Infants Hosp.), 324 N.L.R.B. 743 (1997); Serv.
Employees Int'l Union, Local 525 (Gen. Maint. Serv. Co.), 329 N.L.R.B. 638, 639 n.10
(1999), enforced, 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers
(New Beckley Mining Corp.), 304 N.L.R.B. 71, 73 (1991), enforced, 977 F.2d 1470 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
123. 334 N.L.R.B. at 1191.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1191-92.
126. Local 254, Serv. Employees Int'l Union (Women & Infants Hosp.), 324 N.L.R.B. at
743.
127. See Iron Workers Local 386 (Warshawsky & Co.), 325 N.L.R.B. 748 (1998)
(finding that the respondent union did not violate section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the NLRA
by handbilling a construction site), enforcement denied, 182 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
128. The NLRA defines the term supervisor in section 2(11) as follows: "[t]he term
supervisor means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." 29
U.S.C. § 152 (11) (2000).
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this issue in NLRB v. Servette, Inc. 2 9 There, the Court overruled the
Board's earlier approach, which differentiated between low level and upper
level supervisors. 3 ° Instead the Court drew a distinction based upon what
the supervisor in question was being induced to do, rather than upon his
level of supervision. Specifically, the Court held that a union may lawfully
appeal to a supervisor to exercise her managerial discretion by making a
business judgment to cease doing business with another person, 13' but may
not induce the supervisor to cease working for her own employer in order
to pressure the employer to cease doing business with another person.'32
The Court's reasoning, in part, is based upon the presence of section
8(b)(4)(ii), which prohibits threats, restraints and coercion of persons
engaged in commerce, as opposed to those employed by such persons.
Implicit in the applicability of the more severe level of conduct to statutory
persons, including supervisors, is that the less extreme actions, inducement
or encouragement be permitted on some level.
Notwithstanding the low-level/upper-level supervisory dichotomy in
Carolina Lumber having been overruled in Servette, application of the
Court's rule nevertheless compels a factual inquiry into the degree or
breadth of a supervisor's authority in order to assess whether the union's
inducement is lawful. For instance, where a union agent appears at a
construction site and merely induces or encourages a supervisor employed
by general contractor to change suppliers or subcontractors, the union does
not violate the Act.'33 However, the Board has held that where statutory
supervisors do not possess the discretion to refuse to handle materials
which have already been delivered, and where those supervisors spend a
good degree of time using such materials, a union's inducement to them to
refrain from working with those products takes on a different appearance
and runs afoul of section 8(b)(4)(i)(B).
134
129. 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
130. Id. at 49 n.4 overruling Local 505, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers (Carolina Lumber Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1961).
131. Id. at 54; see also Butcher's Union Local 506 (Adolph Coors Co.), 268 N.L.R.B.
475, 478 (1983) (reiterating this concept against the backdrop of a case involving the
boycott of Coors Beer at a festival), enforced, 753 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1985); San Francisco
Labor Council (Arden-Mayfair, Inc.), 191 N.L.R.B. 261, 265-66 (1971) (explaining the
distinction, this time finding a violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii) where a union agent made
threats to picket without restriction), enforced, 475 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1973); Truck Drivers
& Helpers Local 592 (Estes Express Lines, Inc.), 181 N.L.R.B. 790, 791 (1970) (describing
a situation where a request was made in the form of a letter).
132. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. at 50-51, 54.
133. See Local 12, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (Cal Tram Rebuilders, Inc.), 267
N.L.R.B. 272, 274 (1983) (finding the threat of a future work stoppage to be speculation
when union merely encouraged that employer change suppliers without making threats of
any kind).
134. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 99 (Associated Pipe & Fittings Mfrs.),
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4. Meeting the Definition of Section 8(b)(4)(ii) Conduct-Threats,
Restraint, and Coercion
Section 8(b)(4)(ii) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
135
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce.
In Section A, supra note 45, the inducement/encouragement area
included an array of conduct, including oral appeals as well as certain
picketing. The wording of the statute in section 8(b)(4)(ii), however, refers
to threats, restraint or coercion. This compels separate analytical inquiry
into statements typically falling into the "threats" category, and actions
routinely assessed in the "restraint or coercion" category. Again, even
assuming the presence of a secondary object to the activities, it is necessary
to determine whether the conduct or action at issue rises to the level of
either section (i) or (ii) conduct.
13 6
a. Threats Within the Meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)
Most common in this area are threats to picket, shutdown or strike.
The Board has routinely held that unqualified threats of this nature directed
at a secondary or neutral party violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).'
37 Failure to
175 N.L.R.B. 738 (1969) (finding no unfair labor practice where managers were asked 
to
delay installation of pipe fittings, a discretionary duty).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (2000).
136. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local 87 (Trinity Bldg. Maint. Co.), 312 N.L.R.B.
715, 742-43 (1993) (reiterating the requirement that both the (i) and/or (ii), as well as the
(B) object components be met in order to find a violation). The Board often does not focus
on this critical distinction, at times simply finding the lack of a threat based upon what is, in
essence, the lack of a secondary object. See, e.g., Shopmen's Local 455 (Stokvis Multi-Ton
Corp.), 243 N.L.R.B. 340 (1979) (finding various threats to be lawful as not having a
secondary object within the meaning of the NLRA).
137. See Operating Eng'rs Local 3 (Westar Marine Servs.), 340 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (2003)
(threat of shutdown); Local 456, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Peckham Materials Corp.), 307
N.L.R.B. 612, 619 (1992) (threat to shut down facility); United Derrickmen & Riggers
Ass'n, Local 197 (Del Guidice Enters., Inc.), 291 N.L.R.B. 1 (1988) (threat to shut down a
job in context of jurisdictional dispute); IBEW, Local 211 (U.S. Capital Telecomm. Corp.),
279 N.L.R.B. 874 (1986) (threat to walk off job); Teamsters Local 705 (Emery Air Freight
Corp.), 278 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1986) (threat to strike); Local 248, Meat & Allied Food
Workers (Serv. Food Stores, Inc.), 230 N.L.R.B. 189 n.2 (1977) (threat to picket);
Associated Musicians (Huntington Town House, Inc.), 225 N.L.R.B. 559 (1976) (threat to
shut down); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners (Am. Modulars Corp.), 203 N.L.R.B. 1112
(1973) (threat of picket of entire jobsite); Gen. Teamster, Warehouse & Dairy Employees
Union Local 126 (Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc.), 200 N.L.R.B. 253, 253 n.2 (1972) (threat to
picket); San Francisco Labor Council (Arden-Mayfair, Inc.), 191 N.L.R.B. 261, 265 (1971)
(threats of picketing). Threats to handbill, as opposed to picket, are assessed differently and
ordinarily would not rise to the level of a violation. See, e.g., United Ass'n of Journeymen
& Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Local 32 (Ramada, Inc.), 302 N.L.R.B.
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carry through the threat does not provide a defense to the assertion that the
threat, itself, rises to the level of section 8(b)(4)(ii)."3 8 Even the threat of a
partial strike has been found to meet the definition.'39 Accordingly, where
a union threatens a picket, it has an affirmative obligation to notify the
target of the threat that the picket will be conducted legally, especially
where it has reason to believe that neutral persons will be at the targeted
site.140 The union must identify the primary disputant in the context of its
threatened action. 4 ' Even where a threat to picket is made outside of the
presence of a neutral party, if directed toward neutrals, it must contain the
aforementioned safeguards. 1
42
The Board has also held that threats of economic pressure against
neutral persons constitute section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct. 43  In this regard,
even unspecified threats of "trouble" have been found to be violative.' 44
Again, as in other areas of Board law, subjective interpretations of the
listener are irrelevant to the analysis; instead, the focal point for
consideration is the specific language used.145  The Board assesses those
words on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the entire nature of the
conversation at issue.
146
919 (1991) (finding a threat to handbill lawful publicity).
138. See Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. at 253 (finding a threat to picket
constituted (ii) despite no picket having occurred).
139. See Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Local 13 (Egg City), 295 N.L.R.B.
704, 712 (1989) (finding the threat to engage in a complete or partial strike was action
within the contemplation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)).
140. Peckham Materials Corp., 307 N.L.R.B. at 619.
141. See Sheet Metal Workers Union Local 2 (Hall Refrigeration Sales & Serv.), 203
N.L.R.B. 954, 955-56 (1973) (threat to strike) (citing Constr., Bldg. Material & Misc.
Drivers Local 83 (Marshall & Haas), 133 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1968)).
142. See, e.g., Local 247, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Rymco, Inc.), 332 N.L.R.B. 1230,
1233 (2000) (describing union threats to primary Rymco that it would shutdown the job of a
neutral general contractor for which it was working unless Rymco employees were union
members); Local 3, IBEW (Teknion, Inc.), 329 N.L.R.B. 337, 339 (1999) (finding that
threat directed at third party who had contracted with employer fell within the ambit of the
NLRA); Operating Eng'rs Local 3 (Westar Marine Serv.), 340 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (2003)
(finding that threat of a coming "storm" constituted threat of closure or work stoppage).
143. See Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
(V.G. Scalf.), 172 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1217 (1968) (holding that a threat to use "economic
pressure" was tantamount to threat to take unrestricted, unlimited economic action of an
unspecified nature against secondary employer and therefore violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
144. See, e.g., IBEW, Local 5 (Jonel Constr. Co.), 164 N.L.R.B. 455, 457 (1967)
(finding a threat of "trouble" sufficient to violate the NLRA) (citing Lafayette Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council (S. Constr. Corp.), 132 N.L.R.B. 673 (1961).
145. See Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers & Warehousemen
& Packers, Local 82 (Champion Exposition Servs., Inc.), 292 N.L.R.B. 794, 795 (1989)
(noting that a threat of a "problem" was, in context, actually a threat of a jurisdictional
problem and not a threat to strike).
146. See e.g., IBEW, Local 38 (Cleveland Electro Metals Co.), 221 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1074
(1975) (emphasizing the importance of a conversation's context in understanding a
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b. Restraint and Coercion Within the Meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)
While the area of threats is fairly clear and succinct, restraint and
coercion occupy a wider, more complex sphere. The Board has defined
coercion as those "non-judicial acts of a compelling or restraining nature,
applied by way of concerted self-help consisting of a strike, picketing or




Certainly, strikes are ordinarily included in that coverage.
48 Again,
generally speaking, picketing also constitutes section (ii) conduct.
49 The
Board examines the nature of the conduct, rather than any one, single
aspect thereof when analyzing the issue.
5° However, as in the section
8(b)(4)(i) area, picketing is not per se section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct. The
Board has held that, where picketing is not intended to, and does not induce
a work stoppage, the conduct is not necessarily coercive. In Carpenters
Health Fund,'15 the United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 had
organized the employees of a benefit fund, jointly administered by the
Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters (a labor organization) and the
multiemployer group with which the carpenters union maintained a
collective bargaining agreement.55 Dissatisfied with the fund's movement
"threat"); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 17 (Firelands Sewer & Water Constr. Co.),
210 N.L.R.B. 150, 150-51 (1974) (finding no threat where union agent's statements were
made against the backdrop of a conversation exclusively about the primary disputant and in
response to a question from the neutral as to what the union would do), enforced, 515 F.2d
505 (2d Cir. 1975).
147. Sheet Metal Worker Int'l Ass'n (Schebler Co.), 294 N.L.R.B. 766, 775 (1989)
(citing Ets-Hotkin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839, 842 (1965), enforced, 405 F.2d 159 (9th Cir.
1968), enforcement denied on other grounds, 905 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
148. See, e.g., Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees Int'l Union (Pratt Towers, Inc.), 337
N.L.R.B. 317, 318 (2001) (holding, inter alia, that a strike constitutes coercion within the
meaning of section 8(b)(4)(ii)), enforcement denied on other grounds, 353 F.3d 197 (2d Cir.
2003). Of course, as discussed supra, where refusals to volunteer fall within the definition
of a strike, they too violate (ii). Local P575, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen, 188 N.L.R.B. 5 (1971).
149. In each of the following cases, the picketing constituted section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct:
Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 87 (Trinity Bldg. Maint.), 312 N.L.R.B. 715 (1993),
enforced, 103 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1996); Laborer's Int'l Union Local 332 (C.D.G. Inc.), 305
N.L.R.B 298 (1991); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers (New Beckley Mining Corp.), 304
N.L.R.B. 71 (1991), enforced, 977 F.2d 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 677 (J.H. Hogan, Inc.), 299 N.L.R.B. 499
(1990).
150. See C.D.G., Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. at 298 (describing a situation where picketing rose
to the level of section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct despite the fact that it took place for only thirty
minutes).
151. United Food & Commerical Workers Union Local 1776 (Carpenters' Health &
Welfare Fund), 334 N.L.R.B. 507 (2001).
152. Id. at 507.
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at the bargaining table, the UFCW Local picketed at a Metropolitan
Regional Council of Carpenters meeting, at which the co-chairman of the
fund was present.' In finding that the picketing did not run afoul of
section 8(b)(4)(ii), the Board rejected the idea that picketing at a secondary
site is per se coercive, 154 and was persuaded that the picket did not induce
neutral employees to cease working. 55  In effect, the decision in
Carpenter's Health Fund stands for the proposition that if no secondary
object can be shown, nor is there evidence of unlawful section 8(b)(4)(i)
conduct, the activity may not necessarily rise to the level of section
8(b)(4)(ii) conduct. As noted earlier, had the union's conduct actually
succeeded in inducing employees of the neutral not to work, then by
definition, the conduct would have constituted both section 8(b)(4)(i) and
(ii) conduct. 15 6 On the other hand, where conduct meets the definition of
inducement or encouragement under section 8(b)(4)(i), but is unsuccessful
in causing its desired result, the Board, absent more, may not find section
8(b)(4)(ii) conduct.'57
Other areas of coercion also compel the same circumspect approach.
Such other forms of conduct which have been found to constitute coercion
include: resort to arbitration;" filing of a lawsuit; 59 photographing or
videotaping; 6 affinity group shopping trips; 'imposition of internal union
153. Id. at 508.
154. Id.
155. Id. at509.
156. Id. at 509 n.8 (and cases cited therein). See Latherers Local 252 (I.C. Minium), 159
N.L.R.B. 550, 551 n. I (1966) (finding violation of section 8(b)(4)(i) for inducing employees
to leave, and violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii) for inducing work stoppage against neutral
employers).
157. See IBEW, Local 441 (O'Brien Elec.), 158 N.L.R.B. 549, 553-54 (1966) (finding
no violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii) without evidence that inducement resulted in work
stoppages or otherwise coerced or restrained a "person" engaged on the project).
158. See, e.g., Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union (NYP Holdings, Inc.), 337 N.L.R.B.
608, 608 (2002) ("[T]he union violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) by resorting to arbitration
with an object of forcing or requiring Holdings to enter into an agreement prohibited by
Section 8(e)."); Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees Int'l Union (Nevins Realty Corp.), 313
N.L.R.B. 392, 392 (1993) (finding a secondary object in the resort to arbitration),
enforcement denied in part on other grounds, 68 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
159. See Iron Workers Local 433 (Otis Elevator Co.), 309 N.L.R.B. 273, 273 (1992)
(concerning a suit filed to enforce arbitral award, which conflicted with an earlier 10(k)
award).
160. See, e.g., Metro. Reg'l Council (Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n), 335 N.L.R.B.
814, 814-15 (2001) (finding that photography or videotaping employees by union pickets
will violate their statutory rights when "in conjunction with other actions indicating a union
might react adversely to employees who cross a picket line.").
161. See, e.g., Pye v. Teamsters Local 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1021 (1st Cir. 1995)
(describing affinity group shopping, which refers to the union intentionally disrupting an
employer's place of business through its agents making bogus inquiries of its customer
service representatives, with no intention of making a bona fide purchase, or making only
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discipline; 162 imposition of monetary penalties;
1 63 refusals to refer
employees for work;' 64 disclaimers of interest;1 65 and even refusing to
execute a collective bargaining agreement.
166
B. Secondary Object-Subsection (B)
To this point, the discussion has focused on the doctrinal principles
governing whether and what kinds of conduct rise to the level of that
proscribed in sections 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii). However, even assuming the
presence of such union conduct, courts will not find a violation unless a
secondary object is present. There must be both a primary dispute and an
enmeshed neutral party in order for a violation to be found.
167 With regard
to the degree to which an alleged neutral party must be enmeshed, the
statutory phrase contained in subsection (B)-"cease doing business"-
involves more than mere literal construction. It does not require a total
termination of business between the two parties, or even the presence of a
direct relationship between the two. 16 8  Rather, it anticipates all such
small purchases with big bills).
162. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 104 (G&B Installations, Inc.), 297
N.L.R.B. 1078, 1078 (1990) (involving a case where the union filed disciplinary charges
and fined a neutral employer who also was a union member); Ventura County Dist. Council
of Carpenters (Commercial Indus. Contractors, Inc.), 259 N.L.R.B. 541, 544-45 (1981)
(finding both section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii) conduct).
163. See, e.g., Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 12 (Acco Constr. Equip., Inc.), 204
N.L.R.B. 742, 756-57 (1973) (involving a union's assessment of penalties for failure to
abide by a hot cargo clause), enforced, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975).
164. See, e.g., Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing &
Pipefitting Indus. (Arthur Venneri Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 828, 829 (1962) (addressing a union's
refusal to refer plumbers to neutral subcontractor in furtherance of a dispute with separate
non-union subcontractor), enforced, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
165. See, e.g., Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n (Limbach Co.), 305 N.L.R.B.
312, 312-13 (1991) (concerning a case in which the union disclaimed interest in 158(f)
relationship), enforced in part, denied in part on other grounds, 989 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
166. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n (Schebler Co.), 294 N.L.R.B. 766, 775 (1989)
(citing Local 418, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 235 N.L.R.B. 144, 146 (1978))
(defining "coercion" as encompassing "non-judicial acts of a compelling or restraining
nature, applied by way of concerted self-help consisting of a strike, picketing, or other
economic retaliation or pressure in a background of a labor dispute.").
167. See Teamsters Local 70 (U.S. Dep't of Defense), 288 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1225 (1988)
(finding no violation of section 158(b)(4)(ii) because threats of picketing were in
furtherance of a primary dispute); Prod. Workers Union Local 707 (Checker Taxi Co.), 283
N.L.R.B. 340, 341 (1987) (finding that the picketed companies were not neutral and so the
conduct was not proscribed by section 158(b)(4)), rev'g 273 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1984).
168. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 525 (Gen. Maint. Serv. Co.), 329 N.L.R.B.
638, 675 (1999) (noting that "cease doing business" does not require a total termination of
business or a direct relationship between the parties), enforced, 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir.
2002).
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proscribed conduct undertaken with a design to pressure a neutral party to
intercede in the Union's dispute with its more direct target. 169 That more
direct target is the entity with immediate control over the employment
terms and conditions about which the Union is protesting.17°
Thus, there is great significance placed on whether, and what factors
dictate a party to be afforded neutral status. It has long been held that the
claimed neutral must be "wholly unconcerned" with the dispute between
the union and its more direct target. 17' Although the "wholly unconcerned"
concept arises in the related corporate entities and struck work areas, 172 its
genesis is rooted in the Supreme Court's 1951 decision in NLRB v. Denver
Building & Construction Trades Council,173 a companion case to the
Court's International Rice Milling decision, discussed below.
The Denver Building case stands for, inter alia, two crucial concepts
predicate to an understanding of secondary object law. In Denver, a union
picketed the presence of a non-union subcontractor, Gould & Priesner, at
that jobsite, causing a strike of an entire construction project. 74 The union
defended its shutdown of the entire jobsite by arguing that its dispute was
not merely with Gould & Priesner, but also with the general contractor,
Doose & Lintner, which had retained Gould, and that its lawful object was
economic. 75  The Court, however, disagreed. The first concept it
pronounced was that the subcontract between the two afforded Doose &
Lintner neutral status, and that evidence of some supervision by a general
contractor over its subcontractor's work does not eliminate the status of
each as an independent contractor. 76  Secondly, the Court adopted the
Board's reasoning that, regardless of the presence of other admirable or
lawful objects, if an object of the union's (i) or (ii) conduct is secondary,
then the conduct is unlawful. 177  Thus, the Court set some important
boundaries. To the union advocate who understandably believes his
organization's dispute is with whoever hired the objectionable non-union
169. Id. (citing Local 732, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers (Servair Maint., Inc.), 229 N.L.R.B. 392, 400 (1977); Local 272, Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers (Miller & Solomon Constr. Corp.) 195
N.L.R.B. 1063 (1972)).
170. See Leslie Homes, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 123, 130 n.21 (1995) (classifying the
employer as primary because the union's actions "were directed at the [employer's] own
hiring practices and employment conditions"), enforced sub nom. Metro. Dist. Council v.
NLRB, 68 F.3d 71 (3d Cir. 1995).
171. See DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 122 (citing the comments of Senator Taft, 93
CONG. REC. 4198 (1947)).
172. See infra notes 297-319 and accompanying text.
173. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
174. Id. at 677-79.
175. Id. at 688.
176. Id. at 689.
177. Id. at 688.
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subcontractor or supplier, Board law turns a deaf ear, consistently holding
that the union's primary legal dispute is with the subcontractor and that the
decisionmaker cannot be the target of section 8(b)(4)(i) or (ii) activity.1 8 It
similarly does not give consideration to other lofty goals and objects if a
secondary object is also present.
This primary-secondary dichotomy serves as the basis of secondary
object law. As mentioned, supra note 170 and accompanying text, the
primary is the entity with the most direct control over the terms and
conditions of employment the union is protesting. For instance, an
electrical union's legal primary dispute is with a non-union electrical
subcontractor, rather than with the general contractor responsible for
retaining the services of that subcontractor.
Out of Denver Building & Trades and International Rice Milling,
grow the rest of secondary object law beginning with some basic
principles. Where a union either induces employees of a neutral party, or
threatens the neutral, no other evidence of secondary object is necessary.
Indeed, enmeshing the neutral party through the proscribed conduct is
precisely that which the statute prohibits. 7 9 Similarly, no actual impact on
the neutral's operation need be proven."s  Even where the union's
inducement has targeted only employees of the primary employer, those
inducements may still violate the Act if there is evidence that shows the
178. See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688
(1951) (finding that a strike was an unfair labor practice because it was against the
contractor instead of the subcontractor); Dist. Council 9, Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied
Trades (We're Assocs., Inc.), 329 N.L.R.B. 140, 142 (1999) (citing Serv. Employees Int'l
Union, Local 87 (Trinity Bldg. Maint. Co.), 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 743 (1993) (noting that it is a
violation to "disrupt the business of an unoffending neutral employer"), enforced, 103 F.2d
139 (9th Cir. 1996)); Omaha Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Crossroads Joint Venture),
284 N.L.R.B. 328, 334 (1987) (noting that the union's right to picket on the premises of a
secondary employer is not absolute), enforced, 856 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1988); Cedar Rapids
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Siebke-Hoyt & Co.), 283 N.L.R.B. 1155, 1157 (1987)
(noting that the union did not have a primary dispute with an employer because it did
business with non-union contractors). Board Member Liebman has criticized this prevailing
concept of neutrality as dated, in view of the proliferation of contractors performing work
traditionally done in-house. Teamsters Local 557 (General Motors), 338 N.L.R.B. No. 133,
897 (2003); Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 525 (Gen. Maint. Serv. Co.), 329 N.L.R.B.
638, 643 (1999), enforced, 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
179. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers (New Beckley Mining Corp.), 304 N.L.R.B.
71, 73 (1991) (holding that a violation is found where picketing has an object of exerting
improper influence on a neutral party), enforced, 977 F.2d 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see, e.g.,
IBEW, Local 98 (The Tel. Man, Inc.), 327 N.L.R.B. 593, 598 (1999) (observing that "the
effective inducement or encouragement of a neutral's employees ... necessarily restrains
and coerces the neutral employer").
180. We're Assocs., Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 143 (citing Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs (Harmstra Builders, Inc.), 304 N.L.R.B. 482, 484 (1991); Carpenters Local 33 v.
NLRB, 873 F.2d 316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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union also possesses a secondary object. 8 ' As mentioned, supra, even
where a union's comments are made to the primary disputant, if their gist is
to enmesh a neutral party, they are routinely found to have a secondary
object and are unlawful.
82
Outside of the common situs context, discussed infra Part III(B)(2),
evidence of object is often clear by virtue of the communication directed at
the targeted neutral. One issue that repeatedly arises is a union's assertion
of an "area-standard" object. Typically, a union will bargain to obtain a
wage scale for its members covering a certain geographic area. That union
has a First Amendment right to picket to protest an employer's failure to
pay that wage, notwithstanding that said employer has no collective
bargaining relationship with the union.'83  However, the Board will
examine the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the assertion
of an "area standard object" is genuine or merely a pretext for an unlawful
object, i.e., one that is recognitional or secondary. Thus, a union claiming
to protest non-payment of the area standard wage scale ordinarily has an
obligation to make a bona fide attempt to determine whether, in fact, the
targeted employer is paying wages that fall below that scale.'8 4 Failure to
make such an attempt, manifest for instance by evidence of inquiries
irrelevant to the issue of wages, affords an inference that the picketing has
an unlawful object. 85  On the other hand, the Board will not find an
inference of an unlawful object if a union makes a bona fide attempt to
determine whether an employer is paying wages consistent with the area
standard and is met with a refusal to divulge relevant information. In that
situation, a union may assume that the employer is not meeting the area
181. See, e.g., Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
(Rexford Sand & Gravel Co.), 195 N.L.R.B. 378, 382 (1972) (finding that the union induced
employees of primary truck drivers, yet manifested a secondary object in its threats made to
a neutral employer).
182. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
183. See Local Union 741, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing
& Pipefitting Indus. (Keith Riggs Plumbing & Heating Contractor), 137 N.L.R.B. 1125,
1126 (1962) (noting that unions have a legitimate interest in maintaining area pay standards
even in the absence of organization or collective bargaining agreement).
184. See Hoisting & Portable Local 101, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (St. Louis
Bridge Constr. Co.), 297 N.L.R.B. 485, 491 (1989) (noting that a picketing union is
obligated to investigate whether the employer's practices are substandard); see also Local
88, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers (W. Coast Cycle Supply
Co.), 208 N.L.R.B. 679, 680 (1974) (stating that area standards picketing can only be
justified when the employers practices can be shown to be substandard).
185. See W. Coast Cycle Supply Co., 208 N.L.R.B. at 680 (noting that the union's failure
to make inquiries resulted in an inference that the union was merely trying to evade the
NLRA). Although this often arises in the context of recognitional object cases, if there is
independent evidence of a secondary object, the assertion of area standards motives should




The more difficult issues concerning the secondary object area fall
into the following categories: the locus of the conduct; common situs and
ambulatory situs issues; product picketing; and related corporate entities
and struck work doctrine.
1. Locus of the Action Being Induced - The Primary-Secondary
Distinction
The secondary object language of the statute-an object of forcing
one person to cease doing business with another-contains a proviso
carving out as lawful any primary strike or picketing.17  Without the
proviso, taken literally, the language of the statute would prohibit
statements made to neutral employees by picketers on a wholly primary
picket line. 88 For example, the union has a dispute with company A and
has placed a lawful picket in front of A's place of business. Employees of
persons neutral to the dispute, approach the facility intending to deliver
goods to A. As they approach, picketers induce and encourage them not to
enter. Certainly, the picketers are inducing those neutral employees not to
work. However, this is not the kind of conduct for which section
8(b)(4)(B) was enacted.
The Supreme Court faced this issue in NLRB v. International Rice
Milling Co., in a case litigated under section 8(b)(4)(A), prior to enactment
of the Landrum Griffin Amendments.189 Although the Court relied heavily
on the lack of evidence that the union attempted to induce concerted action,
today, the case stands for the proposition made clear in the proviso to
subsection (B) to which it led-namely, that primary picketing does not run
afoul of the Act, regardless of any resultant secondary effect it may have.'
90
186. See Orange County Dist. Council of Carpenters (Gordon Builders, Inc.), 227
N.L.R.B. 832, 841 (1977) (finding that the union was reasonable in interpreting the
employer's failure to cooperate with the union's inquiries as an admission of its failure to
meet area standards); Target Stores, Div. of Dayton-Hudson Corp. (Painters Dist. Council 2
of the Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades), 292 N.L.R.B. 933, 939 (1989) (finding that
union's repeated attempts to get information concerning wages and benefits from the
employer was as extensive as circumstances would permit).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (2000). The proviso reads, "Provided, [t]hat nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing."
188. See DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 6 (citing ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW 241 (1978) for the observation that the literal language of the statute is too
vague to draw the boundary between illegal secondary, as opposed to lawful primary
activity).
189. 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
190. Id. at 670-71 (observing that the picketing was directed at neutral employees "in a
manner traditional in labor disputes," something it refused to find prohibited by §
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Rice Milling, of course, presented the case of neutral employees
making their approach to a primary picket line, upon which they were
induced not to cross or work.' 9' The doctrine, however, is not limited to
that set of facts. The Board has held that, regardless of where a union has
gone to extend the invitation, if it is merely inviting action at the struck or
picketed primary premises (the so-called "hot site"), its conduct is
protected and does not violate section 8(b)(4)(B).' 92 On the other hand,
picketing or other proscribed conduct, which invites action at a neutral site
would take on a different appearance and constitute a violation. 93 Thus,
this so-called "hot site doctrine" distinguishes between a union visiting
neutral employees at a neutral employer's place of business, where it
merely encourages them not to cross a primary picket line elsewhere,
versus inducing those neutral employees to not even load up their own
trucks or to leave their own neutral employer's premises. The former
invites action at the primary site and is protected, while the latter invites
action at the neutral site and is an unlawful secondary inducement within
the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(i)(B). 194 Where the primary disputant has
sent a truck to a neutral site for loading and the truck itself becomes the
"hot site," the inducement to neutral employees not to load the truck may
be entirely lawful, provided the union is lawfully picketing the truck.
95
It is significant to note that applicability of the "hot site doctrine"
presupposes the presence of a struck or picketed primary site. Such should
be implicit in the language of the proviso to subsection (B), which specifies
the carve-out for a "primary strike" or "primary picketing. 196 The Board
has repeatedly held that, in the absence of a lawful primary strike or picket
line, where a union induces its members to refuse to handle goods, or work
for their employers in furtherance of a sister local's primary dispute with
158(b)(4)).
191. Id. at 669-70.
192. Teamsters Local 379, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers (Gerrity Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 629, 633 (1974); Local 139, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs (Fox Valley Constr. Material Suppliers Ass'n), 182 N.L.R.B. 72, 76 (1970);
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union (Interborough News Co.), 90 N.L.R.B. 2135 (1950).
193. See Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 346 (Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315, 319
(1949) (noting explicitly that, in furtherance of a primary dispute with Standard Oil, the
union had been clear that cargo of neutral Pure Oil, bound for a primary Standard dock, was
not "hot" upon leaving the Pure refinery).
194. Id.
195. Such a case would be governed by the well-known Moore Dry Dock standards,
discussed infra. Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547
(1950). See also Teamsters Local 612, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers (AAA Motor Lines, Inc.), 211 N.L.R.B. 608, 610 (1974) (discussing the concept
of "picketing between the headlights").
196. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (2000).
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another company, the inducing union violates section 8(b)(4)(i)(B). 97 Only
if the primary union notifies the neutral employees and their neutral
employer that the dispute is between it and the primary disputant would
such inducements not violate the Act.198
2. Common Situs/Ambulatory Situs Issues
Where primary and secondary employers occupy one premises, the
premises is referred to as a common situs.' 99 Where the site itself is mobile,
it is referred to as an ambulatory situs.2°° The requisite "occupation" by the
primary, which is necessary for a common situs to be found, compels a
case-by-case analysis, with the inquiry focusing on whether there is a
sufficient presence of the primary at the alleged common situs.
20 1
Common situs cases often present the most complex issues in
secondary boycott law.2°2 The problem of featuring both primary and
secondary parties in one place compels the Board to balance the union's
right to target the primary disputant, as in International Rice Milling, while
at the same time, preserving the right of the secondary party to be free from
a dispute not its own.203  The Board undertook just that task in In re
Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.).2°4
Moore Dry Dock actually involved the more unusual ambulatory
197. Gen. Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 563 (Oshkosh Ready-Mix Co.), 186
N.L.R.B. 219, 227 (1970); Grain Elevator, Flour & Mill Workers (Continental Grain Co.),
155 N.L.R.B. 402, 410-11 (1.965), enforced, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see Teamsters
Local 584, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers (Fairway Farms,
Inc.), 141 N.L.R.B. 638, 643 (1963) (holding that, even though the union failed to picket, it
still violated section 158(b)(4)(i)(b) because it had induced employees of neutral employer
not to load up the truck of the primary disputant at the neutral site. The analysis should not
substantially change where the primary union is doing the inducing.).
198. Oshkosh Ready-Mix Co., 186 N.L.R.B. at 227.
199. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-591 (Burlington N. R.R.),
325 N.L.R.B. 324, 327 (1998); see also DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 9 (stating that the
common situs involves both the secondary and primary employers sharing, in some manner,
the physical premises being picketed); see also United Mine Workers, Dist. 2 (Jeddo Coal
Co.), 334 N.L.R.B. 677, 687 (2001) (observing that "[t]wo or more employers performing
separate tasks on a common premises constitute a common situs.").
200. See, e.g., Dist. Council 9, Bhd. of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers (Alfred
Sherwood), 176 N.L.R.B. 599, 602 (1969) (nothing that an ambulatory situs is, by its nature,
designed to travel).
201. See United Steelworkers of America, Local 6991 (Minute Maid Co.), 177 N.L.R.B.
791, 792 (1969), supplemented by 191 NLRB 1 (1971) (considering "whether the evidence
is sufficient to establish ... that direct and immediate relationship between the picketing and
the object picketed necessary to a finding of purely primary picketing") (alterations in
original).
202. DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 9.
203. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
204. 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
2005]
942 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:4
situs-the union's primary dispute was with the owner of a ship, which had
come to rest at a neutral dry dock owned by Moore. °5 Certainly, the union
has a right to target the primary disputant, namely the ship. However,
Moore as a neutral party has the right to have its dock free from a dispute
between the union and another party with which it has an arm's-length
relationship. Thus, the Board developed four evidentiary criteria/guidelines
to help determine whether a union's picketing at a common or ambulatory
site is primary, rather than secondary.2 6 As a predicate matter, a union has
an affirmative obligation to attempt to minimize the impact of its picket on
neutral employers at such sites, without substantial impairment to the
effectiveness of the picket itself.207 In furtherance of that obligation, a
union's picketing at a common site is presumptively primary, or lawful, if:
[First,] [t]he picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of
the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises;
[second,] at the time of the picketing the primary employer is
engaged in its normal business at the situs; [third,] the picketting
is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs;
and [fourth,] the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is
with the primary employer.2 s
Where a union meets these four conditions, it is afforded a rebuttable
presumption that its picketing is primary, and thus protected. °9 A union's
failure to comply with any one of the four aforementioned criteria may
result in a rebuttable presumption that the picketing is secondary, or
unlawful. 20 The union bears the evidentiary burden of proving compliance
with the four conditions.2 1  In either case, the Board has long held that the
Moore Dry Dock guidelines are not to be applied mechanically, nor does
205. Id. at 548-59.
206. Id. at 549.
207. Burlington N. R.R., 325 N.L.R.B. at 327 (1998) (citing Retail Fruit & Vegetable
Clerks Union, Local 1017 (Retail Fruit Dealers Ass'n), 116 N.L.R.B. 856, 859 (1956),
enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957); Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 87 (Trinity
Bldg. Maint. Co.), 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 743 (1993), enforced, No. 95-70524, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30299 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1996); IBEW, Local 323 (Renel Constr., Inc.), 264 N.L.R.B.
623 (1982).
208. Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. at 549.
209. Gen. Truck Drivers, Warehousemen, Helpers & Auto. Employees, Local 315
(Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.), 306 N.L.R.B. 616, 625 (1992), enforced, 20 F.3d
1017 (9th Cir. 1994); United Mine Workers, Dist. 2 (Jeddo Coal Co.), 334 N.L.R.B. 677,
687 n.5 (2001).
210. Ironworkers Local 433 (Carlson S.W. Corp.), 293 N.L.R.B. 621, 622 (1989),
enforced, 930 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1991); Local 379, Bldg. Material & Excavators (Catalano
Bros.), 175 N.L.R.B. 459, 461 (1969).
211. Carlson SW. Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. at 622.
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the breach of one of the four criteria establish a per se violation.
21 2 Where a
union complies with all four criteria, the presumption of legality may be
rebutted upon evidence of a secondary object.
213  However, in order to
rebut that primary presumption, the evidence must show a secondary object
concurrent with the section 8(b)(4)(i) or (ii) conduct.
214  It has been
observed that lawful, secondary handbilling, either followed or preceded by
an otherwise lawful, primary picket line does not convert that picket line
into one with a secondary object.21
5 Similarly, no presumption of a
continuing unlawful object will be found where there is a hiatus in the
activity. 216 On the other hand, where the clarity of a secondary object is so
obvious by virtue of repeated statements made to a neutral, application of
the Moore Dry Dock guidelines is not necessary, and even picketing which
conforms to those guidelines may be proscribed.
21 7 Once again, the
212. Jeddo Coal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. at 687 n.5; IBEW, Local 332 (W.S.B. Elec., Inc.),
269 N.L.R.B. 417, 421 (1984); IBEW, Local 861 (Plauche Elec., Inc.), 135 N.L.R.B. 250,
255 (1962).
213. See, e.g., Orange County Dist. Council of Carpenters, Local 2361 (John C. Wabbel
and J.A. Stewart Constr.), 242 N.L.R.B. 585, 587 (1979) (describing how the union
complied with all four criteria, including picketing at the proper gate but it also took
disciplinary action against employees of neutral contractors who crossed the picket line in
violation of section 158(b)(l)(A)), enforced, 639 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1980); Local 369,
IBEW (Garst-Receveur Constr. Co.), 229 N.L.R.B. 68 (1977) (describing how union
picketed in conformance with all four Moore Dry Dock criteria, but told neutral general
contractor that a picket line at any gate constituted an invisible picket line around the entire
project and that all would be cleared up if the job were 100 percent union and the primary
disputant was off the site), enforced, 609 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1979); Local 441, IBEW
(Rollins Communications, Inc.), 222 N.L.R.B. 99, 100-01 (1976) (describing remarks made
by union agent to neutral general contractor regarding conditioning the removal of pickets
upon termination of a subcontract with primary disputant Rollins), enforced, 569 F.2d 160
(D.C. Cir. 1977); IBEW, Local II (L.G. Elec. Contractors, Inc.), 154 N.L.R.B. 766, 766
(1965) (noting that upon asking a union representative how he could rid himself of pickets,
the agent of a neutral general contractor is told he must terminate the primary disputant and
sign a contract with a union affiliated with the AFL-CIO).
214. See IBEW, Local 11 (Jones & Jones, Inc.), 154 N.L.R.B. 766, 766 (1965) (noting
that the statement was made while the picketing was ongoing).
215. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 525 (Gen. Maint. Serv. Co.), 329 N.L.R.B.
638, 681 (1999) (noting that the administrative law judge cited Laborers Local 332 (C.D.G.,
Inc.), 305 N.L.R.B. 298 (1991)), enforced, 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
216. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 1245, 229 N.L.R.B. 236, 241
(1977) (rejecting the presumption of a continued unlawful object after a hiatus). But see San
Francisco Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Goold Elec., Inc.), 297 N.L.R.B. 1050 (1991)
(describing how concurrent unlawful picketing tainted the legality of subsequent
handbilling).
217. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. (Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths,
Forgers & Helpers), 244 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1086 (1979) (noting how the Board found a picket
line unprotected based upon, inter alia, evidence of repeated conversations between a union
agent and neutral, in which the union conditioned resolution of the dispute upon the neutral
agreeing to terminate its relationship with the primary), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 842 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1988).
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presence of a lawful object, such as an area standards object, as discussed,
supra, does not mitigate a union's unlawful, secondary object.
Accordingly, the Moore Dry Dock standards have been applied to picketing
which failed to conform to them but which also was undertaken with an
otherwise lawful area standards object.
2 18
The Moore Dry Dock criteria have themselves been the subject of a
variety of issues and cases over the years. Perhaps the simplest of the four
is the last one, requiring the union to identify the primary disputant.
Certainly, where a union fails to identify the primary at all, either with
signs or in some other way, it is in breach of Moore Dry Dock 4.219 Mere
reference to the neutral employer, on either a picket sign or leaflet, does not
alone, alter or mitigate the union's otherwise clear identification of the
primary. 220 Additionally, where a union promptly corrects a defect in its
picket signs, perhaps having identified the neutral instead of the primary,
the use of the incorrect sign does not support the finding of a violation.22 '
More complicated issues arise under Moore Dry Dock 1 and 2,
specifically related to the concept of whether the primary is present at the
site being picketed. Moore Dry Dock 1 and 2 are related concepts, with the
presence of the primary at the core of both issues. Certainly, if the primary
is not present at the location in question, then that location is not the situs
of the dispute and picketing would be in breach of Moore Dry Dock 1,
although one does not need the aid of evidentiary guidelines, or application
of Moore Dry Dock, to find that kind of picketing secondary.222
218. Millwrights, Local 1102 (Dobson Heavy Haul, Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1309
(1965).
219. See, e.g., Ironworkers, Local 433 (Aram Kazazian Constr., Inc.), 293 N.L.R.B. 621
(1989) (describing how the union failed to identify primary on its picket signs) (citing
Laborers Int'l Union, Local 389 (Calcon Constr. Co.), 287 N.L.R.B. 570 (1987)), enforced,
930 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1991); Local 87, Serv. Employees Int'l Union (Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co.),
279 N.L.R.B. 168, 174-75 (1986) (noting how the union fails to identify primary on picket
signs); Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees Int'l Union (N.Y. Ass'n for the Blind), 250
N.L.R.B. 240, 244-45 (1980) (failing to identify primary on signs).
220. See, e.g., Pac. N.W. Dist. Council of Carpenters (DWA Trade Show & Exposition
Servs.), 339 N.L.R.B. 1027 (2003) (referencing neutral supplier Sysco but in context of a
larger identification of the primary Trade Show).
221. See Local 3, IBEW (Surf Hunter Elec. Co.), 172 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1968) (finding that
an incorrect sign was not a violation).
222. See, e.g., United Mine, Workers Dist. 2 (Jeddo Coal Co.), 334 N.L.R.B. 677, 687-
88 (2001) (observing that if the primary is not present, then the picketing at the secondary
location is purely secondary) (citing Carpenters Dist. Council (Gulf Coast Constr. Co.), 248
N.L.R.B. 802 (1980)); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Silver View Assocs.),
216 N.L.R.B. 307, 308 (1975) ("Respondent... failed to conform to the Board's Moore
Dry Dock criteria since the picketing did not occur when the primary employer was engaged
in its normal business at the situs of the dispute."), enforced, 530 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1976); United Steelworkers, Local 6991 (Auburndale Freezer Corp.), 177 N.L.R.B. 791,
792 (1969) (concluding that the primary was present at the picketing location),
supplemented by 191 N.L.R.B. 1 (1971). See also Seafarers Int'l Union (Am. Commercial
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Additionally, if the primary is deemed not present, it clearly cannot be
engaged in its normal operations at the site. Thus, attaching a definition to
the term "presence" becomes significant.
Often the issue presented is the lack of primary employees at work at
the time of the picketing. It is well established, however, that the absence
of those primary employees, alone, does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the primary has no presence, or that as a result, the union
may not picket the site.22 ' A variety of factors are considered, including but
not limited to: whether the absence of primary employees is due to the
picketing; 2 4 visits to the site by supervisors of the primary;
2 25 the
intermittent resumption of the primary's work at the site;
226 the primary's
efforts to recruit new employees to work at the site in question;
227 cessation
of the picketing upon completion of the primary's contractual
obligations;228 the duration and/or permanence of the primary's 
absence; 229
and whether the primary continued to store tools at the site.
23 °
While none of these indicia is, in and of itself, dispositive of the issue,
they are often considered in tandem with the level of knowledge (actual or
constructive) the union has regarding both the presence of the primary, and
regularity of its schedule. The Board has held that where the union has
either actual or constructive knowledge of the primary's regular schedule,
and the primary employer is absent from a common site for extensive other
periods of time for reasons not associated with the picketing itself, a
union's continued picketing in such circumstances runs afoul of both
Moore Dry Dock 1 and 2.231 On the other hand, where a union has no
Barge Line Co.), 253 N.L.R.B. 337, 339 n.3 (1980) (concluding that, where primary
employees were not employed at the neutral site, the site was purely secondary), enforced,
672 F.2d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
223. See IBEW, Local 595 (Hayward Elec. Co.), 261 N.L.R.B. 707, 709 (1982)
(determining that in some instances the absence of the primary employer employee's are not
determinative of an illegal object); Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo. (S. Colo. Prestress
Co.), 222 N.L.R.B. 613, 617 (1976), enforced, 560 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1977) ("But,
absence of the primary disputant during picketing is not conclusive of the issue. Rather, the
totality of circumstances must be evaluated."); Local 3, IBEW (New Power Wire & Elec.
Corp.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1093 (1963) (finding no violation of section 158(b)(4) where
union otherwise complied with Moore Dry Dock guidelines for permissible picketing),
enforced, 340 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1965).
224. S. Colo. Prestress Co., 222 N.L.R.B. at 617; New Power Wire & Elec. Corp., 144
N.L.R.B. at 1094.




229. S. Colo. Prestress Co., 222 N.L.R.B. at 617.
230. Id.
231. See Dist. Council 9, Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades (We're Assocs., Inc.),
329 N.L.R.B. 140, 142 (1999) (noting that the union was aware that primary painting
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knowledge that a primary's employees are not scheduled to work on a
particular day, or is unaware of the work schedule, its picket may not run
afoul of Moore Dry Dock 1 and 2.232 As a corollary concept, where an
employer either intentionally or inadvertently misleads a picketing union as
to when primary employees will be working at the site, such behavior
undercuts the very standards developed to balance the competing interests.
Picketing in conformance with the deception, notwithstanding the actual
lack of presence, is deemed primary and presumptively lawful.233
Moore Dry Dock 3 issues are perhaps the most confusing of the group.
Two separate areas are ripe for discussion here: the first involves a concept
known as "picketing between the headlights," while the other concerns the
use of so called "reserved gates."
The picketing between the headlights concept most often arises in
construction site cases. Where a union has a primary dispute with a
subcontractor at a common site construction project, its Moore Dry Dock 3
obligation to limit its picketing reasonably close to the situs of the dispute
requires that it ask the neutral landowner, construction manager, general
contractor or its agent, permission to picket in and around the portion of the
site occupied by the primary subcontractor-in other words, in between the
headlights of the trucks of that primary employer. 3 4 In AAA Motor Lines,
the union picketed a number of facilities, and did so "between the
contractors had not been engaged in any activities at a common situs for over a month);
Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 525 (Gen. Maint. Serv. Co.), 329 N.L.R.B. 638, 678-79
(1999) (also discussing an ally relationship with the primary employer), enforced, 52 Fed.
Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002); Carpenters' Dist. Council (Farmers & Merchs. Bank), 196
N.L.R.B. 487, 490 (1972); IBEW, Local 861 (Brownfield Elec., Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1163,
1166 (1964) (finding no violation of the Moore Dry Dock criteria where primary
employees' absence was temporary and due to the picketing); see also Painters Dist.
Council 38 (Edgewood Contracting Co.), 153 N.L.R.B. 797, 800 (1965) (describing that the
union picketed seven days a week all day, but where primary employees only worked
Saturdays and Sundays). But see IBEW, Local 302 (ICR Elec.), 272 N.L.R.B. 920, 920 n.2
(1984) (finding no violation, despite the union having been informed that the primary would
not be working or receiving supplies on a particular day in question, because such
arrangement was only fleeting rather than representing a regular and permanent schedule;
only ten percent of the primary's work was completed, thereby manifesting a clear intention
to return; and the picketers arrived at the site only after neutral employees had already gone
to work such that they could not be approached and departing before neutral employees left
for the day).
232. See IBEW, Local 595 (Hayward Elec. Co.), 261 N.L.R.B. 707, 709 (1982) (citing
Linoleum, Carpet & Soft Tile Layers Union No. 1236 (Cascade Employers Ass'n), 180
N.L.R.B. 241 (1969)).
233. See IBEW, Local 640 (Timber Bldgs., Inc.), 176 N.L.R.B. 150, 151 (1969) (setting
forth the criteria as to when the picketing of a primary employer at a common situs is in
violation of section 158(b)(4)(B)).
234. See Local 612, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
(AAA Motor Lines, Inc.), 211 N.L.R.B. 608, 610 (1974) (describing requirements for
picketing close to the situs of the dispute).
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235
headlights" only when given the invitation. The Board adopted the
judge's conclusion that, in order to satisfy Moore Dry Dock 3, the initiative
lies with the picketing union to ask permission to picket between the
headlights.236 Of course, where access to the site is denied, the union is free
to place its picket at the front entrance.
37
However, where the common site is not a construction project, and
instead is the primary's normal place of business, which is also occupied by
other neutral parties, the Board has held that the union need not ask to
picket between the headlights.
238  Additionally, even where a neutral
employer at such a site invites the union to picket closer to the primary
disputant, if the invitation seriously impairs the union's right to effectively
picket, refusal to respond to the initiative will not support an inference of
secondary object.239 Certainly, whether a union will be obligated to ask to
picket between the headlights should be considered on a case-by-case basis,
and compels a "rule of reason" approach rather than a mechanistic
application of AAA Motor Lines.
24 °
Reserved gates present a different group and wider array of issues.
Most often, reserved gates are seen at construction sites, though their use is
obviously not limited to the construction industry. Simply put, an
employer may confine the permissible area of picketing by erecting
separate entrances or gates, one for use by the primary disputant, its
employees, and all those seeking to deliver to it, and the other for the
employees and suppliers of parties neutral to that dispute. Reserved gates
may be established wherever convenient, provided that they are not
intentionally hidden from public view, or such that they otherwise
substantially impair the effectiveness of the picketing.
241 Where a union
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See Wire Serv. Guild, Local 222 (Miami Herald Publ'g Co.), 218 N.L.R.B. 
1234,
1235 (1975) (picketing in front of entrances fully met Moore Dry Dock standards),
enforced, 532 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1976); see also 40-41 Realty Assocs., Inc., 288 
N.L.R.B.
200, 205 (1988) (holding that a union's obligation to minimize the effects of picketing 
on
neutrals does not compel an employer to grant access to private property).
238. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 218 N.L.R.B. at 1235.
239. Id. at 1235-36.
240. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasonably
concluded that a union's compliance with a valid reserved gate system offered it 
the kind of
alternative such that it could dispense with asking to picket between the headlights. 
See
Allied Concrete, Inc. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that where 
union
picketed between the headlights by following the trucks onto premises, but could 
have
limited its picket to one gate at the construction project, reserved solely for 
the struck
employer, its employees and suppliers, constituted a violation).
241. See Carpenters Local 33 (CB Constr. Co.), 289 N.L.R.B. 528, 529 (1988) (noting
that the reserved gate is so hidden and remotely located that the restriction of picketing 
there
would severely impair the picketing effectiveness), enforced, 873 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
IBEW, Local 323 (Renel Constr., Inc.), 264 N.L.R.B. 623, 624 (1982); see also Local 501,
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fails to confine its picket to the gate reserved for the primary, it breaches
Moore Dry Dock 3.242
Once again, where a picket is placed at a lawfully maintained neutral
gate, that picket is both coercive and secondary, regardless of whether it
causes a work stoppage or not. 3 Where the gate system is ignored, by
either the primary or neutrals, a union is just as free to disregard it.244
However, there must be evidence of a pattern of destruction of the gate
system; mere isolated breaches do not serve as sanction for the union to
simply ignore an otherwise valid reserved gate system.245 Similarly, a
union's isolated or de minimus breach of a valid reserved gate system is
not, alone, sufficient to show a secondary object.246 Additionally, even
where a reserved gate system becomes so tainted as to free a union to
IBEW v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 888, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners, Local 354 (Sharp & Tatro Dev. Co.), 268 N.L.R.B. 382 (1983), enforced, 767 F.2d
934 (9th Cir. 1985); Local 453, IBEW (S. Sun Elec. Co.), 237 N.L.R.B. 829, 830 (1978)
(holding that a union need not confine its picket to a primary gate which unreasonably
denies it the opportunity to convey its message to the public and can picket a neutral gate in
such circumstances, unless another location, separate from the neutral gate but close to the
site would afford the union a locale from which it could reasonably convey its message),
enforced, 620 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1980)). Nevertheless, the picketing gate need not be
located so as to maximize the picket's effectiveness. See Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 433, 303 N.L.R.B. 287, 291 (1991); IBEW, Local 970, 306
N.L.R.B. 54, 60 n.19 (1992).
242. See Dist. Council 9, Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades (We're Assocs., Inc.),
329 N.L.R.B. 140, 143 (1999); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-591
(Burlington N. R.R.), 325 N.L.R.B. 324 (1998); Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 433 (Oltmans Constr. Co.), 272 N.L.R.B. 1182, 1186
(1984); IBEW, Local 332 (W.S.B. Elec., Inc.), 269 N.L.R.B. 417, 421 (1984).
243. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 19 (Delcard Assocs., Inc.), 316
N.L.R.B. 426, 437 (1995) (noting that the union stationed at least one individual in a "rat"
costume at a neutral gate), enforcement denied on other grounds, 154 F.3d 137 (3d Cir.
1998).
244. See W.S.B. Elec., Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. at 421 (holding that frequent breach of the
neutrality of reserved gate justifies picketing of neutral gate) (citing Local 323, IBEW (J.F.
Hoff Elec. Co.), 241 N.L.R.B. 694 (1979), enforced, 642 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
245. See W.S.B. Elec., Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. at 421 (holding that "isolated occurrences"
which do not establish "pattern of destruction" of reserved gate do not justify picketing at
neutral gate) (citing United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting
Indus., Local 48 (Calvert Gen. Contractors), 249 N.L.R.B. 1183, 1183 n.2 (1980)); Local
369, IBEW (Kelley Elec. Co.), 216 N.L.R.B. 141, 144 (1975) (stating that isolated violation
of "reserve" status of gate did not grant union the right to picket it); see also United Ass'n of
Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus., Local 388 (Metz &
Weiland Plumbing & Heating), 252 N.L.R.B. 452, 460 (1980), enforced, 703 F.2d 565 (6th
Cir. 1982); Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees Int'l Union (N.Y. Ass'n for the Blind), 250
N.L.R.B. 240 (1980) (both holding that minor, isolated breaches or defects in a reserved
gate system do not, alone, defeat its vitality).
246. See, e.g., Metro. Reg'l Council (Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n), 335 N.L.R.B.
814, 814 n.1 (2001) (refusing to find secondary object based upon five seconds of isolated
picketing at a neutral gate).
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disregard its dictates, it may be reestablished and must be honored provided
the union is given notice thereof.247 Finally, in order to enable a union to
ensure the integrity of the gate system it is bound to honor, the Board has
long approved of the use of union "observers," stationed at or near the
neutral gate, regardless of whether the union possesses any evidence of a
taint of that gate.248 Those observers, however, must limit their activity to
observing, and nothing more; otherwise the conduct may constitute
picketing and be deemed secondary. 249
The United States Supreme Court first approved the concept of
reserved gates in Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers v. NLRB. °  In that case, General Electric initially
erected separate gates for the use of its subcontractors in an effort to
insulate GE employees from frequent labor disputes between the
subcontractors and unions.251' Those subcontractors performed a variety of
tasks, ranging from repair and maintenance work to construction. GE
employees often lacked the necessary skills to perform these tasks, or
simply commanded too much money for the company to pay them.
252
The complication arose when the union with which GE had a
collective bargaining relationship struck to protest a series of unsettled
253grievances. Striking employees picketed at all gates, including those
specifically reserved for the subcontractors. GE argued that the picketing
unlawfully enmeshed the employees of the neutral subcontractors-in other
words, the picketing had an object of forcing or requiring the
subcontractors to cease doing business with GE. Although it cited the
247. W.S.B. Elec., Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. at 421 (citing Local 470, United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners (Mueller-Anderson, Inc.), 224 N.L.R.B. 315, 216 (1976), enforced,
564 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1977)). See Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Ironworkers, Local 433 (R.F. Erection), 233 N.L.R.B. 283 (1977) (holding that notice of
either the resurrection of an earlier tainted reserved gate system, or the initial installation of
such a system, is effective upon receipt), enforcement denied, 598 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.
1979).
248. See IBEW, Local 98 (The Tel. Man, Inc.), 327 N.L.R.B. 593 (1999)
(acknowledging the possibility of a union observer at a neutral gate, but holding nonetheless
that the observer had engaged in impermissible conduct); Local 12, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs (Cal Tram Rebuilders, Inc.), 267 N.L.R.B. 272, 274 (1983) (noting the presence of
Teamsters' observers at neutral gate).
249. See, e.g., The Tel. Man, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. at 593 (finding a violation where the
union's neutral gate observer wore an "observer" sign, the other side of which revealed a
message identical to the one used by picketers at the primary gate); Delcard Assocs., Inc.,
316 N.L.R.B. at 437 (noting that union observers at neutral gates carried observer signs, the
reverse side of which featured messages identical to those on conventional signs, and one of
the alleged observers even wore a "rat" costume).
250. 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
251. Id. at 668.
252. Id. at 669.
253. Id.
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Moore Dry Dock guidelines with approval,25 4 the Court formulated a new
test for the situation with which it was presented, one which compelled
concern over whether GE was merely trying to insulate aspects of its
operation from a lawful, primary picket. The Court held that the gate must
be separate, marked and set apart from other gates, and that the work done
by those who use the gate must be unrelated to the normal operations of the
employer-i.e., that it must be of a kind that would not, if done when the
plant as engaged in its regular operations, necessitate curtailing those
255operations . If unrelated, then the union would be precluded from
targeting such a neutral subcontractor. If related, then the subcontractor
would be nothing more than an extension of the primary's operation and
necessarily would curtail the operation if not performed, making such a
subcontractor a lawful, primary target.256
Three years after the General Electric decision, the Court applied the
same test again in a similar case.257 In Carrier, the union struck the Carrier
Corporation by picketing several entrances to the Carrier plant, including a
railroad right of way used by railroad personnel to make deliveries to the
company.2 Holding that the location of the picketing was important but
not decisive, the Court articulated that ownership of the railroad right-of-
way by a different company did not limit applicability of the same test
formulated in the General Electric decision.25 9
The presence of two distinct legal tests-from Moore Dry Dock and
General Electric-has caused confusion regarding which test is to be
applied to any given set of facts. The General Electric test, reiterated in
Carrier, is limited to the set of facts present in those cases; namely, an
otherwise primary premises becomes a common site by virtue of
subcontractors or others working at the site, causing concern that the nature
of the work is so related to the primary's operation that those others should
not be afforded neutral status.
The Board has repeatedly held that where the common situs at issue is
not that of the primary's-in other words, where the premises is owned or
operated by a neutral-the General Electric test is inapplicable, and the
Moore Dry Dock guidelines are applied exclusively. 260 The decision in
254. Id. at 677-78.
255. Id. at 681.
256. See, e.g., Local 557, Int'l Chem. Workers Union (Crest, Inc.), 179 N.L.R.B. 168,
174 (1969) (noting that the question is whether the work is of a character which is necessary
to the employer's own regular operations).
257. United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.), 376 U.S. 492 (1964) [hereinafter
Carrier].
258. Id. at 494.
259. Id. at 499.
260. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-591 (Burlington N. R.R.),
325 N.L.R.B. 324, 327 (1998) (rejecting union's argument that General Electric test should
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Carrier in no way alters that conclusion. Carrier merely held that General
Electric continued to apply where the common site was that of the
primary's, notwithstanding the fact that a railroad not owned by the
primary was used to access its facility for purposes of making deliveries to
the struck employer.2 6' Nor does the General Electric test ever apply to
any case in the construction industry.262 Even where the primary disputant
in a construction case is the general contractor, as opposed to a
subcontractor, whether the picketing is primary will be governed entirely
by the application of the Moore Dry Dock standards rather than the
General Electric test.263
A separate doctrine, though at first glance similar to the test set forth
in General Electric, also warrants mention. Initially, whether at a common
site or a primary one, section 8(b)(4)(B) does not seek to interfere with a
union's ability to reach lawful, primary targets. Thus, as per International
Rice Milling, where a union seeks to interfere with a person delivering
supplies to the primary at its own place of business, section 8(b)(4)(B) does
not prohibit such conduct.264  Although the same concept applies at
common situs, it is necessarily curtailed to some degree, particularly at
construction sites, where supplies are often used by more than one
apply and upholding use of Moore Dry Dock test); Gen. Truck Drivers, Warehousemen,
Helpers & Auto. Employees, Local 315 (Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.), 306
N.L.R.B. 616, 626 (1992), enforced, 20 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Local 32B-32J,
Serv. Employees Int'l Union (Dalton Sch.), 248 N.L.R.B. 1067 (1980) (holding that the
"related work" test of General Electric was inapplicable to picketing at neutral employer);
Kinty v. United Mine Workers, 544 F.2d 706, 715 (4th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing when
reserved-gate picketing is unlawful or lawful)); see also Gen. Teamster, Warehousemen &
Dairy Employees Union, Local 126 (Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc.), 200 N.L.R.B. 253, 256
(1972) (noting that the union deliberately tried to "enmesh neutrals in its dispute" by
directing picketing efforts at neutral employees).
261. See Burlington N. R.R., 325 N.L.R.B. at 328 (refusing to apply Carrier where the
neutral employer owned the picketed premises).
262. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Markwell & Hartz, Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B. 319
(1965) (distinguishing the manufacturing premises in General Electric from the construction
premises in the case at bar, and therefore rejecting the General Electric test), enforced, 387
F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967); Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Local
433 (Chris Crane Co.), 294 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 (1989) (upholding the courts' uniform refusal
to apply the General Electric test in the construction setting), enforced, 883 F.2d 1024 (9th
Cir. 1989) (citing Ironworkers Local 433 (Oltmans Constr. Co.), 272 N.L.R.B. 1182, 1186
(1984)). Such application would run contrary to the holding of NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951), which conclusively preserved the separate and
independent status of general and subcontractors at a construction site. .Simply put, as a
matter of law there is no subcontractor whose work is so related to the general that the
general could not continue without its work.
263. See, e.g., Local 470, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners (Mueller-Anderson, Inc.),
224 N.L.R.B. 315, 317 (1976) (noting that union's dispute with general contractor took
place on land actually owned by that general contractor), enforced, 564 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir.
1977).
264. NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 665 (1951).
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contractor. This clouds the picture as to precisely which supplies constitute
a lawful, primary target for the picketing union. Accordingly, the Board
has developed a doctrine which appears to mirror the one set forth in
General Electric, holding that a union picketing at a common site may
target only those suppliers that provide materials essential to, or solely for
use in, the primary employer's normal operations.265 Although this
doctrine developed in reserved gate cases, the author submits that it is
equally applicable to situations where no gates have been erected. Indeed,
at a common site, where the union's conduct is governed by Moore Dry
Dock, the company union is nevertheless prohibited from interfering with
those persons making deliveries to neutral entities.266 Accordingly, a union
picketing at a common site with no reserved gate system may not induce
employees of neutral persons to cross its picket line, regardless of whether
it has conformed to the Moore Dry Dock guidelines.267
3. Picketing the Product: The Tree Fruits Decision
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Fruit
& Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), held
certain picketing targeted against a particular product, albeit one sold at an
establishment wholly neutral to the dispute, to be lawful and not running
afoul of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 268  In Tree Fruits, a union of fruit and
265. See Chris Crane Co., 294 N.L.R.B. at 183 (rejecting union's argument that it had a
right to picket a neutral gate through which electrical, sanitation, telephone, food and trash
collection services contractors entered for purposes of serving all subcontractors at the site,
including the primary), enforced, 883 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1989); Local 323, IBEW (J.F.
Hoff Elec. Co.), 241 N.L.R.B. 694 (1979) (finding unlawful union picketing of neutral
gate), enforced, 642 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 450
(Linbeck Constr. Corp.), 219 N.L.R.B. 997 (1975) (noting that general contractor tainted an
otherwise valid reserved gate by delivering certain supplies to the primary subcontractor
through that neutral gate), enforced, 550 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1977). The Board has recently
referred to this rule as the "supplier exception," stating that it occupies a middle ground in
section 8(b)(4) as a corollary of both the General Electric and Moore Dry Dock tests. See
Burlington N. R.R., 325 N.L.R.B. at 328 (rejecting union's application of "supplier
exception" test but recognizing the existence and validity of the test). The author, however,
finds it more analytically palatable to view the doctrine as nothing more than a truism-that
a union's picket at a common site is permitted to target those individuals delivering
materials to the primary, as opposed to those bound for neutral parties at the site, a concept
already enunciated in International Rice Milling Co..
266. See, e.g., Local 379, Bldg. Material & Excavators (Catalano Bros.), 175 N.L.R.B.
459, 460 (1969) (describing the situation where union sought to induce employees of neutral
secondary employers to refuse performance of services for their employer at a common site
shared by the primary and other neutrals).
267. Id.
268. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). The decision was issued concurrent with the Court's decision
in NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964). See supra notes 129-135 and accompanying
text for a full discussion of the Servette decision.
952
SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
vegetable packers struck Washington state fruit packing companies that
sold Washington state apples to Safeway supermarkets.269 In furtherance of
its strike, the union instituted a consumer boycott against the apples, and,
inter alia, placed pickets at a number of Safeway stores in the area,
including the apples on store shelves.27°
The Board originally found that the picketing at the stores violated
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), based on application of the "publicity proviso" to
that section, viewed at that time as insulation for otherwise coercive
conduct but which constituted "publicity other than picketing. 27' Based
upon its reading of the proviso, essentially that if the conduct was deemed
to be picketing, it automatically was, as a matter of law, coercive and could
not be saved by the proviso, the Board concluded that all picketing at a
secondary site like the Safeway stores rose to the level of section
8(b)(4)(ii) .
The Board's reasoning, which inherently raised constitutional
concerns, compelled the Court to address the issue of whether all picketing
at a secondary site is necessarily coercive within the meaning of section
8(b)(4)(ii). 73 The Court provided a lengthy analysis of the legislative
history before holding that not all picketing at a secondary site rises to the
level of section 8(b)(4)(ii) and finding that the picketing of Washington
state apples at the Safeway stores was lawful.274  Notably the Court
pronounced that, "[i]t does not follow from the fact that some coercive
conduct was protected by the proviso, that the exception 'other than
picketing' indicates the Congress had determined that all consumer
picketing was coercive.,, 2" The second Debartolo decision issued by the
Court in 1984, of course, holds that the publicity proviso to section 8(b)(4)
protects nothing, and is merely a clarification of a truism-that non-
coercive conduct, such as peaceful handbilling, does not rise to the level of
section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct. Accordingly, the author submits that, to the
extent it holds otherwise, this narrow portion of Tree Fruits has been
overruled sub silentio by DeBartolo H.
Much of the Court's Tree Fruits decision is based on the particular
facts of the case-namely that the apples. were one of numerous products in
269. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 59-60.
270. Id. at 60.
271. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits Labor
Relations Comm.), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1177 (1961). As discussed supra, the publicity
proviso is now viewed as nothing more than a clarification rather than a section that
insulates otherwise coercive conduct. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
272. Id. at 1177.
273. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 62.
274. Id. at 72-73.
275. Id. at 69.
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the store,276 that the picket was limited to the apples and did not interfere
with store employees' ability to handle them, 27 7 that the pickets only
appeared after the stores opened and then departed before they closed, and
that the union lived up to its promise to store managers not to seek to cause
store employees to strike.278  Indeed, in at least four places, the Court
mentions the "isolated evil" section 8(b)(4)(B) was designed to prevent,
279
namely picketing designed to shut off all trade with the secondary
employer, as opposed to that which only persuades its customers not to
purchase a struck product s.
Implicit in the Court's reasoning is its understanding that the
narrowly-tailored picketing at issue was primary, rather than secondary,
activity. The Court essentially holds that picketing, which is narrowly
targeted at the struck product, does not rise to the level of section
8(b)(4)(ii) conduct. However, even assuming arguendo that product
picketing rises to the level of section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct, without a
secondary object, it does not run afoul of subsection (B), thereby making
the section (ii) component of the analysis largely irrelevant.28'
It is far more analytically palatable to view this kind of product
picketing through the secondary object facet, rather than deciding whether
it rises to the level of section 8(b)(4)(ii). The Board and Court in Tree
Fruits presupposed that the Safeway stores were secondary sites. However,
inasmuch as the apples occupied those sites, those stores are not much
different than any other common site. Certainly, a la Moore Dry Dock, the
Tree Fruits Court required the union to minimize the impact of its picket on
the stores,282 and clearly the apples were present in the stores at the time the
union picketed. The only Moore Dry Dock requirement not imposed was
that the union ask to picket in the apple aisle of the store.
Today, the Board adheres to the reasoning of Tree Fruits, having
recently relied on the decision when holding that picketing does not per se
276. Id. at 60.
277. Id. at 61.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 63, 68, 70-71.
280. Id. at 70.
281. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 87 (Trinity Bldg. Maint. Co.), 312 N.L.R.B.
715, 742-43 (1993) (requiring both the presence of an unlawful action and an unlawful
object for a violation to be found), enforced, 103 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1996); see also supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
282. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-591 (Burlington N. R.R.),
325 N.L.R.B. 324, 327 (1998) (citing Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks' Union, Local 1017
(Retail Fruit Dealers' Ass'n), 116 N.L.R.B. 856, 859 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1957)); Trinity Bldg. Maint. Co., 312 N.L.R.B. at 743 (using the minimization principle
because it is often difficult to distinguish lawful primary activity from unlawful secondary
conduct), enforced, 103 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1996); IBEW, Local 323 (Renel Constr., Inc.),
264 N.L.R.B. 623 (1982).
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constitute section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct.283 When picketing a product at a site
it occupies, regardless of whether it is characterized as a common site or a
secondary one, a union's picket signs must clearly identify the struck
product, and the union must inform consumers that the labor dispute is
between the union and the primary employer (as opposed to the secondary
employer).284 Similarly, where threatening to picket a product, the scope of
the union's statements is limited purely to statement providing notice of its
intention to engage in lawful activity.285
a. The Merged Product Doctrine - Safeco and Its Genesis
Despite the logic of permitting a union to target its picket at a primary
product located on the premises of a neutral entity, not all such otherwise
primary product picketing is insulated from section 8(b)(4)(B) liability
under Tree Fruits.
Unlike the typical common site situations, in which the Board is
merely guided by the presence of the primary at an otherwise neutral site,
in product situations, the degree to which the primary's presence becomes
merged with the neutral's business is of paramount importance.
Specifically, where the goods or services produced by the primary
employer being targeted have lost their identity and have become so
merged into the secondary employer's product or service, primary product
picketing at the neutral's site cannot avoid necessarily having an object of
enmeshing that neutral party past the bounds of lawfulness.286 For instance,
283. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1776 (Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund), 334 N.L.R.B. 507 (2001) (finding that the purpose of picketing was to
influence the primary employer to improve the relationship with the Union).
284. Barbara E. Snyder, Comment, Consumer Picketing and the Single-Product
Secondary Employer, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 112, 117 n.43 (1979).
285. See, e.g., Butchers Union Local 506 (Adolph Coors Co.), 268 N.L.R.B. 475, 478
(1983) (holding that the union impermissibly threatened organizers of a local festival when
it picketed in furtherance of its dispute with Coors Beer because festival organizers had
already granted Coors permission to sell its products).
286. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 832 (Duro Paper Bag Mfg. Co.), 236
N.L.R.B. 1525 (1978) (describing a picket of a store because of the paper bags it used),
vacated and remanded, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1981), reversed on other grounds, 258
N.L.R.B. 67 (1981); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139 (Oak Constr., Inc.), 226
N.L.R.B. 759, 759 (1976) (finding a section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation when the union picketed
and handbilled at a neutral location in order to cause a company to cease business with
another); Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 226 N.L.R.B.
754, 757 (1976) (finding picketing in furtherance of a dispute with Safeco was an unfair
labor practice), enforcement denied, 627 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 607
(1980); Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers & Taxicab Drivers, Local 327 (Am. Bread Co.), 170
N.L.R.B. 91, 92 (1968) (describing a union picket that remained in front of the entrance to
this restaurant until the employer's bread was removed from the premises), enforced, 411
F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
20051
956 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:4
in American Bread, a union picketed a number of restaurants in furtherance
of its primary dispute with a bread manufacturer, which supplied product to
those restaurants for use in sandwiches, toast and bread crumbs.287 The
Board was persuaded that bread used by a restaurant lost its identity when
served, and essentially became part of the restaurant's product, rendering
customers without a true choice to boycott the bread without necessarily
having to boycott the restaurant.288  Such circumstances make primary
picketing impossible.
Similarly, in Duro Bag, the Board applied the same doctrine in
holding that paper bags used in a supermarket did not, in fact, lose their
identity or merge into the store such that those bags could, in fact, be
targeted with a picket. 28 9 Although the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Board's conclusion, it did not disagree
with the test it applied,290 which the Board adopted as law of the case on
remand when it merely reversed its conclusion, rather than the test itself.29'
The merged product doctrine culminated with the Supreme Court's
decision in Safeco Title Insurance.292 In that case, Safeco, an underwriter
of title insurance had arm's-length relationships with five local title
insurance companies in the state of Washington, whose sale of Safeco
insurance accounted for over ninety percent of their gross revenues.293 The
Court cited the Board's merged product doctrine with approval,294
distinguished Tree Fruits where the apples were but one of many products
available, and held that picketing the local title insurance companies left
consumers with no other option but not to do business with those local title
insurance companies at all.
295
Clearly there is a wide spectrum between picketing one item in a
grocery store and picketing the only product the neutral person sells.
Acknowledging that problem, the Court in Safeco observed that neither its
decision nor the one in Tree Fruits would be controlling; rather, the critical
question being whether the secondary appeal would be reasonably likely to
threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss, and leaving such a
287. Am. Bread Co., 170 N.L.R.B. at 93.
288. Id.
289. Duro Paper Bag Mfg. Co., 236 N.L.R.B. at 1527.
290. Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting the exception to the
Tree Fruits doctrine for products "so merged with the secondary employer's total offering to
the public that for all practical purposes, a boycott of the struck product is not separable
from a boycott of the secondary employer.").
291. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 832 (Duro Paper Bag Mfg. Co.), 258
N.L.R.B. 67 (1981).
292. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
293. Id. at 609.
294. Id. at613 n.7.
295. Id. at 613.
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question up to the Board to resolve in future cases.
296
4. The Ally Doctrine-Struck Work, Single and Joint Employers, and
Related Corporate Entities
Whether an entity is neutral can pose difficult analytical issues, as
discussed above in the context of products on shelves, common site
problems and location issues. However, assuming neutral status is
otherwise clear, there are also circumstances in which it can be lost or
forfeited; specifically, when neutrals are deemed so allied with the primary
disputant that they are no longer entitled to neutral status. The Board has
long held that the burden a union has to demonstrate a loss of neutrality by
virtue of such an alliance with the primary is a heavy one, limited to two
general areas: one, where the entity has performed struck work; or two,
where the entity may be deemed either a single or joint employer with the
primary.2 97
This "ally doctrine" is derived from the comments of Senator Taft,
one set of which was made during the legislative discussions which led to
the Taft-Hartley Amendments, and the other set of which was made in
reflection sometime thereafter.298 Senator Taft first said that the purpose of
section 8(b)(4)(A) was to "[m]ake it unlawful to resort to a secondary
boycott to injure the business of a third person who is 'wholly
unconcerned' in the disagreement between an employer and his
employees."2 99 Later, he added that "the secondary boycott ban is merely
intended to prevent a union from injuring a third person who is not
involved in any way in the dispute or strike. [I]t is not intended to apply to
a case where the third party is, in effect, in cahoots with or acting as a part
of the primary employer.
30 0
Out of these comments grew two separate and distinct branches of
what is known today as the "ally doctrine.'3 1 The first involves situations
in which a party's neutrality is lost by virtue of its performance of struck
296. Id. at 616 n. 11. See generally Lee Modjeska, The Tree Fruits Consumer Picketing
Case-A Retrospective Analysis, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1005 (1984) (maintaining an excellent
explanation and detailed analysis of this entire subject).
297. See Local 557 (General Motors), 338 N.L.R.B. No. 133 n.3 (2003) (Member
Liebman concurrence); United Mine Workers (Boich Mining Co.), 301 N.L.R.B. 872, 873
(1991) (referencing the two general areas), rev'd, 955 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1992), and
supplemented, 308 N.L.R.B. 953 (1992); Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union (Gannett
Co.), 271 N.L.R.B. 60, 67 (1984) (discussing the "ally" doctrine).
298. See S. Council of Indus. Workers (Missoula White Pine Sash Co.), 301 N.L.R.B.
410, 415 (1991) (summarizing the "ally" doctrine).
299. 93 CONG. REC. 4198 (1947).
300. Id. at 8709.
301. The ally doctrine is discussed in depth and at length in a number of scholarly
articles. See, e.g., DERESHINSKY, supra note 9, at 121 n.1.
2005]
U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:4
work, viz, the very work the primary employer's employees are not
performing in strike against that primary employer.3 °2 The second branch
involves cases in which the alleged neutral entity constitutes either a single
employer or joint employer with the primary.3 °3 Into this second category
also falls a line of cases involving the neutrality of subsidiaries of larger
corporate entities. Cases implicating one branch of the ally doctrine
often do not involve the other branch, and thus, each has developed
independently, compelling separate discussions.3 5 Although the ultimate
issue is the same, analysis of whether a party is a single or joint employer
with the primary requires application of criteria not associated with
whether that party is performing struck work.
a. Performance of Struck Work
Struck work is that which, but for the strike, would be done by striking
employees.3 6 Where an otherwise neutral secondary employer performs
such work, and where such performance is on behalf of, and assists the
primary disputant in its effort to avoid the economic consequences of the
strike, the secondary entity loses its neutral status.30 7 However, where the
302. See NLRB v. Bus. Mach. & Office Appliance Mechs., Local 459 (Royal
Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that the independent repair
companies were so allied with the employer that section 158(b)(4) did not afford protection
to the employee performing the work); Douds v. Metro. Fed'n of Architects, Eng'rs,
Chemists, & Technicians, Local 231, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (denying petition by
the employer because the employees did not participate in a secondary boycott); Missoula
White Pine Sash Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 415.
303. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 525 (Gen. Maint. Serv. Co.), 329 N.L.R.B. 638,
640 (1999), enforced, 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
304. Local 235, Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union (Henry Wurst, Inc.), 187
N.L.R.B. 490 (1970); Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San Francisco Examiner,
Div. of Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972).
305. See Missoula White Pine Sash Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 415 (describing the
independence of the two branches of the "ally" doctrine) (citing Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 560 (Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.), 248 N.L.R.B. 1212
(1980)).
306. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers (Boich Mining Co.), 301 N.L.R.B. 872, 873
n.10 (1991), rev'd, 955 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1992); Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union
(N.Y. Amsterdam News), 269 N.L.R.B. 102, 104 (1984); Gen. Drivers & Helpers Union,
Local 554 (Prairie Ford Truck Sales), 253 N.L.R.B. 1, 3 (1980); Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-128 (Petroleum Maint. Co.), 223 N.L.R.B. 757, 758 (1976)
(showing in each case that the definition of "struck work" is the work performed by the
employees had they not been striking).
307. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers), 244 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1085 (1979) (defining the
circumstances in which a union may boycott a secondary employer); W. States Reg'l
Council No. 3 (Priest Logging, Inc.), 137 N.L.R.B. 352, 353-54 (1962) (concluding that the
secondary and primary employers were allies since the secondary employer had never been
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secondary entity's performance of the struck work has come only by virtue
of contact from the primary's customer and without any intervention from
the primary, no ally relationship is established.
0 8 Similarly, where the
assistance rendered by the secondary entity does not constitute the actual
performance of the struck work, no ally relationship is established.
309 Thus,
it is clear that for neutral status to be forfeited in this area, the secondary's
performance of the work must be nothing more than an attempt by the
primary to continue its operations in the face of the strike, and in which the
primary must be complicit."0
b. Single Employers, Joint Employers, and Corporate Subsidiaries
The other branch of the ally doctrine encompasses essentially two
separate, but related conceptual areas: first, whether ostensibly neutral
parties may be deemed to be either a single employer with the primary, or
in a joint employer relationship with that primary; and second where the
neutral and primary are corporate subsidiaries of a larger entity.
A single employer differs significantly from a joint employer. The
Board has long held a single employer relationship to exist where two
purported entities, though nominally separate, actually constitute one
single, integrated enterprise.3 ' The existence of a single employer
relationship is a purely factual issue, based on four criteria: the
interrelation of operations, the extent of common management, the
to the primary employer's place of business and the secondary employers's employees
performed many of the union workers' tasks), enforced, 319 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1963); Royal
Typewriter, 228 F.2d at 557 (holding that the independent repair companies were so allied
with the employer that section 158(b)(4) did not apply).
308. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. at 1086; see also Local 379, Bldg. Material
& Excavators (Catalano Bros.), 175 N.L.R.B. 459, 460 (1969) (noting that neutral gypsum
board company retained a different carrier in the face of a strike against the one with which
it routinely did business).
309. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 776 (Pennsy Supply, Inc.), 313 N.L.R.B.
1148, 1149 n.2 (1994). See Gen. Teamsters Local 959 (Anchorage Cold Storage), 266
N.L.R.B. 834, 838 (1983) (declining to apply the "ally" doctrine), enforced, 743 F.2d 734
(9th Cir. 1984); Local 61, Int'l Chem. Workers Union (Sterling Drug, Inc.), 189 N.L.R.B.
60, 61 (1971) (describing how primary end strikebound Sterling Drug contracted with
neutral Vogel to receive supplies and materials and load them onto railroad cars in order to
enable delivery to Sterling's facility).
310. See Dist. 65, Distributive Workers (Pinto Serv. Corp.), 211 N.L.R.B. 469, 469 n.3
(1974) (finding no ally relationship because the secondary's actions had nothing to do with
the employee's strike), enforced, 577 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Brewery Workers
Union No. 8 (Bert P. Williams, Inc.), 148 N.L.R.B. 728, 732 (1964) (finding an ally
relationship when the primary subcontracted its work because of an imminent failure in
negotiations).
311. See Pennsy Supply, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. at 1164 (defining the Board's interpretation
of "single employer") (citing NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir.
1982)).
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centralized control of labor relations, and finally, common ownership or
financial control. The Board places more emphasis on the third component
and less on the final one.312  A joint employer relationship, however,
presupposes the presence of two, separate entities, which share or co-
determine matters governing essential terms and conditions of
employment. 3 3 A joint employer relationship may also be established by
contract, which gives one entity control over the composition of the other's
workforce.1 4 Regardless, there must be some showing that one employer
meaningfully affects the terms and conditions of the other.
The corporate subsidiary area effectively borrows from the joint
employer concept, only taking it a step further. The issue, of course, is
whether a union with a dispute against one subsidiary of a larger corporate
entity is free to lawfully picket at a separate such subsidiary on the basis of
the shared corporate parent. The Board has held that where neither the
picketed subsidiary nor its parent corporation exercises actual, active and
substantial control over the labor relations of the primary disputant, then
the picketed subsidiary is entitled to neutral status. 35 The seminal cases in
the area, Hearst Corp.316 and Baltimore News American3t 7 have long stood
for the proposition that a corporate parent's mere potential control over the
labor relations of all its subsidiaries does not operate to waive its other
subsidiaries' neutral status. Rather, there must be a showing of actual,
rather than potential control.318 Again, as in the single and joint employer
areas, the Board's decisions in this area are made on a case-by-case basis,
312. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. at 1164; see also Int'l Union, United Mine
Workers (Boich Mining Co.), 301 N.L.R.B. 872, 873 (1991), rev'd, 955 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.
1992); Ironworkers Dist. Council (Hoffman Constr. Co.), 292 N.L.R.B. 562, 563 n.4 (1989)
(elaborating the importance of the third factor), enforced, 913 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1990).
313. See Pennsy Supply, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. at 1161 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc.,
691 F.2d at 1122).
314. Both Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers' Union Local 29 (J.E. Hoetger & Co.), 221
N.L.R.B. 1337, 1339 (1976) and Local 363, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers (Roslyn Americana Corp.), 214 N.L.R.B. 868 (1974) represent
an exception to the rule that general contractors in the construction industry ordinarily
maintain their neutrality and separate identity from the subcontractors they retain.
315. See S. Council of Indus. Workers (Missoula White Pine Sash Co.), 301 N.L.R.B.
410, 415 (1991); Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 525 (Gen. Maint. Serv. Co.), 329
N.L.R.B. 638, 640 (1999) (noting the need for the actual control to be both active and
substantial), enforced, 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002).
316. Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San Francisco Examiner, Div. of Hearst
Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced, 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1018 (1972).
317. Am. Fed'n of Tel. & Radio Artists (Baltimore News Am. Div., Hearst Corp.), 185
N.L.R.B. 593 (1970), enforced, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
318. See Gen. Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 749 (Transp., Inc.), 218 N.L.R.B. 1330,
1335 (1975) (holding that common ownership does not automatically guarantee one entity
controls the other), enforced, 535 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir. 1976).
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without giving emphasis to one, controlling factor.3" 9
C. Hot Cargo Agreements - Sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(A)
320
As discussed, supra, notwithstanding the initial Taft Hartley
prohibition on certain kinds of secondary activity, voluntary agreements
between unions and other persons, which obligated those others not to do
business with certain third parties, were originally held outside the Act's
proscription.32' Indeed, the Sand Door Plywood case led to the enactment
319. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 560 (Curtin Matheson
Scientific, Inc.), 248 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1980). For cases in which neutrality was lost and an
ally relationship was established, see, e.g., S.W. Council of Indus. Workers (Missoula White
Pine Sash), 301 N.L.R.B. 410, 416 (1991) (holding that neutrality was lost where corporate
parent exercised actual control over subsidiary by virtue of its agent's supervision and
control over labor relations of the primary subsidiary, his presence at bargaining sessions
and grievance meetings, and activity in monitoring the strike); Curtin Matheson Scientific,
Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. at 1214 (stating neutrality was lost where corporate policy dictated a high
degree of integration of warehouse operations, including one subsidiary's performance of
the struck work of another); S. Council of Indus. Workers (Duke City Lumber Co.), 253
N.L.R.B. 808, 814-15 (1980) (finding the operating partner's neutrality lost where he
exhibited control by virtue of centralized labor policy and active participation in grievances,
negotiations, and work rules, as well as in the areas of sales, purchasing, clerical,
accounting, employee training and other functions); Graphic Arts Int'l Union Local 262
(London Press, Inc.), 208 N.L.R.B. 37, 39-40 (1973) (holding neutrality of subsidiaries was
lost where common owner, Luros, actively participated in day-to-day operations of primary,
attended meetings, and utilized centralized accounting practices and employee benefit
plans). For cases in which no loss of neutrality was established and thus no ally
relationship, see, e.g., Local 2208, IBEW (Tyco Labs., Inc.), 285 N.L.R.B. 834 (1987)
(finding no loss of neutrality despite, inter alia, corporate parent's having named the
primary subsidiary's board of directors, issued the payroll checks, visited the primary
subsidiary during the strike, and provided advice regarding the collective bargaining
agreement); United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 1439 (Price Enters.,
Inc.), 271 N.L.R.B. 754, 756 (1984) (holding no loss of neutrality where corporate divisions
operated autonomously in their day-to-day activities, including in the area of labor relations,
and despite use of common premises, insurance and profit-sharing programs); Transport,
Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. at 1334-35 (holding no loss of neutrality where exclusive control of all
matters relating to primary subsidiary and corporate parent were shown to be separate,
despite, inter alia, common insurance and leased hauling arrangements), enforced, 535 F.2d
1246 (3d Cir. 1976); Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers (Vulcan Materials Co.), 208 N.L.R.B. 540, 543 (1974), enforced, 543 F.2d 1373
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding no loss of neutrality despite, inter alia, participation by parent in
primary subsidiary's collective bargaining negotiations, where subsidiary's president
retained final control thereof, and despite the fact that parent made certain insurance,
pension and salary continuation programs available to subsidiary, where latter retained the
right to reject them).
320. Although the title of this Article is nominally devoted to section 158(b)(4)(B), it
would be incomplete not to include discussion of section 158(e) and section 158(b)(4)(A).
The bulk of this Article is devoted to section 158(b)(4)(B), inasmuch as, in the author's
experience, it is the more frequent source of litigation and dispute.
321. See Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB (Sand Door
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of section 8(e), which, as discussed supra Part II, makes it unlawful for a
union and an employer to enter into an agreement whereby the employer
32agrees to cease doing business with another person. In Sand Door, the
material facts involved a dispute between carpenters' unions and the
distributor of certain doors in Southern California.323 The doors were
manufactured by a non-union outfit, and when delivered to the construction
site for hanging, union carpenters refused to handle them.324
The charged unions defended their action on grounds that their
collective bargaining agreement with the general contractor contained a
clause which permitted workmen to refuse to handle non-union material.325
Of course, inasmuch as there was no section 8(e) at the time, the Court
understandably stated that there was "no occasion to consider the invalidity
of hot cargo provisions as such. 3 26 However, the Court did find a violation
of the Act's secondary boycott prohibitions, observing, inter alia, that the
contractual provision at issue "may well not have been the result of [free]
,, 327choice, and that the employer's "acquiescence in the boycott may be
anything but free." 328 Most significantly, the Court rejected the unions'
hot cargo clause defense, and held that unions were not free to enforce such
clauses through self-help proscribed by section 8(b)(4), and instead were
essentially relegated to other forms of legal recourse.329
Section 8(e)'s thrust is to prohibit secondary agreements-viz-
agreements manifesting a union's objective to affect not merely the terms
of those employees in the unit covered by the agreement, but rather to
impact other bargaining units. Unlike section 8(b)(4)(B), this section
proscribes agreements made between labor organizations and statutory
employers, not merely persons. 3 0 The Act proscribes both written as well
31as implied agreements. 31 On the other hand, where an employer merely
acquiesces to a union's demands that it not do business with a third party,such action does not rise to the level of an agreement within the meaning of
Plywood), 357 U.S. 93, 99 (1958) (recounting the history of the Taft Hartley Act).
322. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2000).
323. Sand Door Plywood, 357 U.S. at 95.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 107.
327. Id. at 106.
328. Id. at 107.
329. Id. at 108.
330. See Local 3, IBEW (Empire Elec. Contractors Ass'n), 244 N.L.R.B. 357, 357
(1979) ("Thus, a construction which makes the terms 'employer' and 'person'
interchangeable runs contrary to the express language of Section [158(e)]").
331. See, e.g., Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots (Seatrain Lines, Inc.), 220 N.L.R.B.
164, 164 n.2 (1975) (holding, inter alia, that where agreement permits employer to do
business with others, but only under extremely onerous conditions, such arrangement
impliedly prohibits the doing business in violation of section 158(e)).
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section 8(e).332
Nine years after the Court decided Sand Door Plywood, its decision in
the seminal work preservation doctrine case of National Woodwork
Manufacturer's Ass'n v. NLRB,
333 crystallized the primary-secondary
distinction in the section 8(e) area. In National Woodwork, union
carpenters refused to handle doors at a Philadelphia construction site.
334
Much like the carpenters in Sand Door Plywood, the carpenters in National
Woodwork relied on a clause in the union's contract with a general
contractor which permitted workmen to avoid handling any doors, which
had been fitted prior to delivery to the jobsite.
335 However, unlike the Sand
Door case, the union carpenters in National Woodwork traditionally
performed all such door-fitting work at the site, and refused to handle doors
which arrived, already pre-fitted.336 The Court was persuaded by the
distinction. Effectively undertaken to preserve bargaining unit work, the
action was primary, rather than secondary. Thus, the Court held that
section 8(e) clause violations and section 8(b)(4)(B) refusal to handle
violations turned upon whether, "the union's objective was preservation of
work.., or whether the agreements and boycott were tactically calculated
to satisfy union objectives elsewhere."
'337 The Court added that the
touchstone concern is whether the agreement or its maintenance was
addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis a vis his
own employees.338 The Court held that the action in National Woodwork
was to preserve work, and thus, primary and lawful.
33 9
Application of such a concept may implicate aspects of representation
law, depending on the nature of the industry in question. For instance, in
National Maritime Union (Vantage Steamship Corp),
3 4 0 the Board struck
down a clause obligating the seller of a vessel to first obtain a written
agreement from the purchaser that the latter would adopt the seller's
collective bargaining agreement with the union.
34 1 Concluding that a single
unit, rather than a multi-unit, was appropriate, and observing the significant
role of hiring halls in the maritime industry, the Board found that the clause
violated section 8(e), where, upon the sale, the hall would simply refer a
332. See Dairy Employees' Union, Local 754 (Glenora Farms Dairy, Inc.), 210 N.L.R.B.
483, 490 (1974) (stating that acquiescence does not always signify agreement).
333. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
334. Nat'l Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 616.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 615-16.
337. Id. at 644.
338. Id. at 645.
339. Id. at 646.
340. 196 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1972), enforced, 486 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1973).
341. Id.
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new group of seamen to the purchaser.342 In District 71, International
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Harris Truck & Trailer Sales,
Inc.),343 on the other hand, a similar clause was found lawful under section
8(e), inasmuch as the Board found the sale of a business was not a
transaction, but rather a substitution of one entity for another. In a more
recent case, the distinction between the sale or transfer of a business (not a
business transaction) and a lease was found by the Board as the crucial
determinant in finding section 8(e) liability, where the clause at issue
obligated the employer to ensure that the terms of the agreement be binding
on lessees as well as concessionaires.3 4
The Court further clarified the work preservation doctrine area when it
decided that not all such agreements are presumptively primary. In NLRB
v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters,45 union employees refused to handle
pipes that had been thread and cut before delivery to the jobsite and relied
on the union's collective bargaining agreement with the subcontractor at
issue, Hudik, which reserved unit employees' rights to perform the work of
threading and cutting pipe.3 6  However, Hudik's agreement with the
general contractor, Austin, and with which the union had no relationship,
obligated Hudik to use certain, specifically identified, pre-thread and pre-
cut pipe, effectively eliminating any choice or control Hudik could have in
connection with the assignment of threading and cutting pipe for that job.347
Accordingly, the Court ultimately agreed with the Board's conclusion that,
despite the presence of a collective bargaining agreement between Hudik
and the union, Hudik was a neutral party to the dispute between the union
and Austin, the general contractor in control of the assignment of the
disputed work, and thus the strike against neutral Hudik was prohibited.348
Thus, as with law in the reserved gate area, which effectively gives neutral
and primary the right to dictate the locus of the dispute, the Court's
decision in Enterprise Ass'n affords neutral status to employers by
permitting them to simply contract away their right to control the
assignment of work, despite collectively-bargained-for obligations to the
contrary.
342. Id. at I101.
343. See 224 N.L.R.B. 100 (1976) (distinguishing Vantage Steamships on grounds that
the maritime industry and its use of hiring halls presented a unique set of circumstances).
344. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, Local 274 (Sheraton Univ. City
Hotel), 326 N.L.R.B. 1058, 1059 (1998) ("Since the terms of the agreement would be
binding on any lessee or concessionaire, in effect the hotel would be prohibited from doing
business with such potential lessee or concessionaire who refused to be bound by that
agreement.").
345. 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
346. NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic
Tub, Ice Machine & Gen. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1977).
347. Id. at 512.
348. Id. at 523.
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Regardless, out of Enterprise Ass'n developed today's work
preservation doctrine. In order for a lawful work preservation agreement to
exist, it must pass two tests: first, it must preserve work traditionally
performed by unit employees; and second, the employer must not only be
bound by the agreement, but also must have the power to assign the work
to the employees (the right of control test).349
Primary work preservation agreements are also referred to as union
standards agreements. Such agreements obligate an employer, consistent
with a primary area standards object, to subcontract to entities which
compensate their own workers consistent with economic terms equivalent
to those negotiated within the union's contract.350 On the other hand,
contract clauses which limit the employer's right to subcontract only to
other entities with which the union has a collective bargaining relationship,
or so-called union signatory clauses, are secondary and thus, inconsistent
with section 8(e).351 Accordingly, the Board has held that where contract
provisions set out to regulate the labor relations policies of other
employers, they are secondary, and that typical such clauses are those
which limit the right to subcontract to entities who are signatory to a union
contract. 2
As discussed supra, section 8(e) contains two provisos-the first
insulates certain kinds of cease doing business agreements related to the
subcontracting of work at a construction site, while the other insulates
cease doing business agreements between garment industry jobbers and
their subcontractors.
349. See NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490 (1980) (determining that
the rules on containers did not constitute a lawful work preservation agreement); see also
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. NLRB, 734 F.2d 966, 974 (4th Cir. 1984) (recording an excellent
summary of the law in this area). In American Trucking, the Fourth Circuit court cited the
first of two ILA decisions regarding containerization rules, the latter of which upheld the
Board's and court's partial invalidation of those rules. See NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 71 (1985) (upholding the Board's invalidation of the rules).
350. See Painters Orange Belt Dist. Council Painters No. 48 (Maloney Specialties, Inc.),
276 N.L.R.B. 1372, 1386-87 (1985) (citing Gen. Teamsters Local 386 (Constr. Materials
Trucking, Inc.), 198 N.L.R.B. 1038 (1972)) ("In short, contract clauses which, purportedly,
would limit subcontracting to employers who are, themselves, signatories to union contracts,
so-called 'union signatory' clauses, have been held statutorily proscribed."); see also
Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 657 (1982) ("There is ample
evidence that Congress believed that union signatory contract clauses of the type at issue
here were part of the pattern of collective bargaining in the construction industry.").
351. See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., 456 U.S. at 666; Maloney Specialities, Inc.,
276 N.L.R.B. at 1388.
352. See Local 277, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (J & J Farms Creamery Co.), 335 N.L.R.B.
1031, 1031 (2001) (citing Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1288 (Nickel's Pay Less Stores),
163 N.L.R.B. 817, 830 (1967) (finding that, since the demonstrator clauses were not
violative of section 8(e), the strikes and picketing in furtherance of obtaining them do not
have an unlawful object), enforced, 390 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
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With regard to the construction industry proviso, inasmuch as those
on-site agreements are lawful, the Board has held that a union is free to
picket to obtain such clauses.3 53 However, consistent with the teachings of
Sand Door Plywood, a union is not free to picket to enforce such a clause,
despite the fact that it is prima facie lawful.3 4 Additionally, even where
the union is merely picketing to obtain such a lawful clause, if its success in
so doing would force the obligated party to cease doing business with
another neutral person, the picket may still run afoul of section
8(b)(4)(B).3 55 Again, the proviso is limited to construction employers and
to work at construction sites. While retailers acting as their own general
contractors have been found to be employers in the construction industry,356
employers who merely prepare materials for use at the construction site
have been found not to be in the construction industry and thus not covered
by the proviso.35 7  Similarly, employers merely delivering building
materials and supplies to a construction site are not involved in on-site
work, thereby making the proviso inapplicable.358
Unlike the construction industry proviso, the garment industry
exception is more expansive, making sections 8(e), 8(b)(4)(A) and
8(b)(4)(B) wholly inapplicable to that industry. This is largely based on the
unique relationship between jobbers, who design garments, and the large
contractors who produce them in bulk.35 9 Accordingly, a union may picket
353. See N.E. Indiana Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apartments),
148 N.L.R.B. 854, 863 (1964) (ruling that the Bricklayers had not engaged in the unfair
labor practices by nearby picketing to obtain a lawful agreement), enforcement denied in
part, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
354. Id.; see supra notes 323-329 and accompanying text.
355. See Centlivre Village Apartments, 148 N.L.R.B. at 856-57. In Centilivre, the Board
held that the union's object of forcing or requiring the termination of a non-union
subcontractor already engaged at the site constituted an unlawful "cease doing business"
object in violation of section 158(b)(4)(B), despite the fact that the union was lawfully
picketing to obtain a construction industry proviso-protected hot cargo clause. Id. at 857.
See also Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Church's Fried Chicken, Inc.), 183
N.L.R.B. 1032, 1038 (1970) (holding that the mere presence of a non-union subcontractor's
employees at the site did not impute an unlawful section 158(b)(4)(B) object to picketing
undertaken with the lawful object of obtaining a construction industry hot cargo, especially
where the union specifically agreed to waive compliance with such clause for contractors
already engaged in work at the site).
356. See Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. at 1036 (finding that a company
acting as its own contractor in building stores is a "contractor in the construction industry").
357. See Int'l Union Operating Eng'rs, Local 12 (Robert E. Fulton), 220 N.L.R.B. 530,
537 (1975) (finding no breach of collective-bargaining agreement for party doing business
with a non-union subcontractor).
358. Catherine R. Lazuran, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of the
Construction Industry Proviso to the NLRA Hot Cargo Provision, 39 A.L.R. FED. 16 §§ 7-
18(1978).
359. See Maramount Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 508, 512 n.15 (1993) (finding that the absolute
exemption from section 158(b)(4)(B) and section 158(e) is based upon the integrated
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to secure or enforce these agreements, often referred to as Hazantown
agreements after the Board decision in that case.36 °
Other issues are often the source of argument and confusion. For
instance, most section 8(e) cases are implicated well after execution of the
agreement in which the objectionable clause is contained. Nevertheless, a
reaffirmation of the clause, such as through a demand for arbitration,
constitutes a new "entering into" thereby removing any argument that
enforcement of the clause is time-barred under the Act's 10(b) six-month
statute of limitations.36' Additionally, the area of collective bargaining
agreements which bind a contracting employer's subsidiaries or partners in
a joint venture has been the source of some litigation.362 However, the
cases in this area simply reiterate and apply the law of corporate
subsidiaries under section 8(b)(4)(B), where actual, active and substantial
control by the contracting entity must be shown over the other entity being
bound. Accordingly, common ownership alone does not eliminate the
neutrality of a subsidiary, and by extension, obligating application of one
subsidiary's contract on another runs afoul of section 8(e).363
Finally, what should not be forgotten in application of any of these
concepts is the potential prospect of antitrust liability for certain "cease
doing business" agreements. In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters, Local 1 0 0 ,3
64 the United States Supreme Court held a union's
section 8(e) construction industry proviso defense inapplicable to an
allegation that its pursuit of agreements obligating construction employers
throughout Texas to do business only with union subcontractors violated
the Sherman Act.3 65 The crucial and determinative factor dictating antitrust
liability in that case was the fact that the union seeking such agreements
had no collective bargaining relationship with the employer they sought to
production process used by jobbers and contractors, as well as the protection of agreements
prohibiting such contracting to sweatshops associated with disadvantaged employees and
substandard working conditions); see also Winefsky & Tenney, supra note 2, at 601.
360. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit & Allied Garment Workers' Unions (Hazantown, Inc.), 212
N.L.R.B. 735 (1974), enforced, 494 F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1974).
361. See Local 1149, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners (Am. President Lines, Ltd.),
221 N.L.R.B. 456, 456 n.2 (1975) ("We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that the allegations of the complaint are not barred by Sec. 10(b) of the Act."),
aff'd, 434 F. Supp. 741 (D. Or. 1977).
362. See N.E. Ohio Dist. Council of the United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners (Ernest
Alessio Constr. Co.), 310 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1023 (1993) (concerning an "anti-dual-shop
clause" in a collective bargaining agreement); see also Dist. Council 51, Int'l Bhd. of
Painters & Allied Trades (Manganaro Corp.), 299 N.L.R.B. 618, 618 (1990) (referring to a
strike that forced a party to sign an "anti-dual-shop clause").
363. See Ernest Alessio Constr. Co., 310 N.L.R.B. at 1026 (finding that a common
ownership provision is not limited to circumstances in which common control is also
present).
364. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
365. Id. at 626.
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bind.3 66 Thus, the Court reiterated that the non-statutory exemption to
antitrust law is limited to situations in which the parties are in a collective
bargaining relationship. 67 In the garment industry, however, attempts to
sue in antitrust to avoid garment industry proviso insulation from
secondary boycott law have proven unsuccessful.36 s
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the labor and employment lawyer with an average workload
will not often come in contact with a secondary boycott, when she does
confront one, it can be a dramatic experience. This is not a garden-variety
discrimination claim, where someone might be owed a few dollars in
backpay. The stakes in these cases are often higher than others, with entire
union campaigns resting in the balance, with employers in danger of losing
large contracts unless the objectionable union conduct comes to a halt. The
lawyer's role as advocate in such situations necessarily takes on enhanced
importance to the affected client, and she is often compelled to act quickly.
For the labor law student, the secondary boycott area is again but one
topic in a larger course of study. Yet, after mastering coercion,
discriminatory discharge, recognition and contract bar principles, section
8(b)(4)(B) potentially creates a tangled web of confusion.
The lawyer's job is to advocate for her client and make the best
argument possible. The student's task is to understand the law and be able
to manifest that understanding in the written form, either in a scholarly
paper or in an examination booklet. In either case, with regard to
secondary boycotts and section 8(b)(4)(B), success cannot be achieved
without an understanding of the very cases reported and discussed in
foregoing Article.
While critics of secondary boycott law may deem it in need of major
revision, such criticism certainly has its place in the world of scholarly
work. Criticism can also work to develop a better understanding of the
subject under attack. However, it is respectfully submitted that criticism
without comprehensive explanation and predicate understanding falls flat
and loses its meaning and significance.
Explanation and understanding of NLRB secondary boycott law is
what this Article has sought to achieve. It has endeavored to place the
366. Id. at 663; see also Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666
(1982) (holding a clause negotiated in the context of a collective bargaining relationship to
be protected by the proviso).
367. Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 663.
368. See Jou Jou Design, Inc. v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union, 643 F.2d 905, 909
(2d Cir. 1981) (holding Hazantown agreements "immune" from antitrust attack in the
garment industry).
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handfuls of confusing, seemingly disparate and irreconcilable things
associated with secondary boycotts into a frame. Indeed, full
understanding, as opposed to blind criticism, is what leads to effective
advocacy-the goal to which both law student and practitioner alike
ultimately aspire.
